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command_and_control_remcos_rat_iocs.toml
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104 lines (89 loc) · 4.14 KB
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[metadata]
creation_date = "2025/08/20"
integration = ["endpoint", "windows", "sentinel_one_cloud_funnel", "m365_defender", "system"]
maturity = "production"
updated_date = "2025/08/20"
[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
description = """
Identifies known execution traces of the REMCOS Remote Access Trojan. Remcos RAT is used by attackers to perform actions on infected machines remotely.
"""
from = "now-9m"
index = [
"endgame-*",
"logs-endpoint.events.registry-*",
"logs-endpoint.events.file-*",
"logs-m365_defender.event-*",
"logs-sentinel_one_cloud_funnel.*",
"logs-system.security*",
"logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*",
"winlogbeat-*",
]
language = "eql"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Potential REMCOS Trojan Execution"
note = """## Triage and analysis
### Investigating Potential REMCOS Trojan Execution
Remcos RAT is used by attackers to perform actions on infected machines remotely.
### Possible investigation steps
- Review the origin of the REMCOS file and the execution chain to identify the initial vector..
- Examine if the process is set to persist in the affected system via scheduled task, Startup folder or Run key.
- Check the network, files and child processes activity associated with the every suspicious process in the execution chain of REMCOS.
- Correlate the event with other security alerts or logs from data sources like Elastic Defend or Microsoft Defender for Endpoint to gather additional context and identify any related malicious activities.
### Response and remediation
- Immediately isolate the affected system from the network to prevent further unauthorized access or lateral movement by the attacker.
- Terminate any suspicious processes identified in the alert, such as PowerShell, cmd.exe, or other flagged executables, to halt any ongoing malicious activity.
- Review and revoke any unauthorized user accounts or privileges that may have been created or modified using tools like net.exe or schtasks.exe.
- Conduct a thorough scan of the affected system using endpoint protection tools to identify and remove any malware or unauthorized software installed by the attacker.
- Restore the system from a known good backup if any critical system files or configurations have been altered or compromised.
- Escalate the incident to the security operations center (SOC) or incident response team for further investigation and to determine if additional systems are affected.
- Implement enhanced monitoring and logging for ScreenConnect and other remote access tools to detect similar activities in the future, ensuring that alerts are promptly reviewed and acted upon."""
references = [
"https://any.run/malware-trends/remcos",
"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0332/",
"https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/exploring-the-ref2731-intrusion-set"
]
risk_score = 73
rule_id = "d8b2f85a-cf1c-40fc-acf0-bb5d588a8ea6"
severity = "high"
tags = [
"Domain: Endpoint",
"OS: Windows",
"Use Case: Threat Detection",
"Tactic: Command and Control",
"Resources: Investigation Guide",
"Data Source: Elastic Endgame",
"Data Source: Elastic Defend",
"Data Source: Sysmon",
"Data Source: SentinelOne",
"Data Source: Microsoft Defender for Endpoint",
"Data Source: Windows Security Event Logs"
]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "eql"
query = '''
any where host.os.type == "windows" and
(
(event.category == "file" and event.type == "deletion" and file.path like "C:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\TH????.tmp") or
(event.category == "file" and file.path : "?:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Roaming\\remcos\\logs.dat") or
(event.category == "registry" and
registry.value : ("Remcos", "Rmc-??????", "licence") and
registry.path : (
"*\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\Remcos",
"*\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\Rmc-??????",
"*\\SOFTWARE\\Remcos-*\\licence",
"*\\Software\\Rmc-??????\\licence"
)
)
)
'''
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1219"
name = "Remote Access Tools"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219/"
[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0011"
name = "Command and Control"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/"