add Rce.java #3
add Rce.java #3
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Summary by CodeRabbit
Walkthrough本次提交新增了 Changes
Sequence Diagram(s)sequenceDiagram
participant C as Client
participant R as Rce Controller
participant E as Executor
participant S as ScriptEngine
participant Y as YAML Loader
C->>R: HTTP 请求 (/rce?参数)
alt 使用命令执行
R->>E: Runtime.exec 或 ProcessBuilder 执行命令
E-->>R: 返回命令输出
else 使用脚本执行
R->>S: 调用 jsEngine 或 groovyshell
S-->>R: 返回脚本执行结果
else 加载 YAML 内容
R->>Y: 调用 yarm 或 secYarm 方法
Y-->>R: 完成 YAML 加载
end
R->>C: 返回执行结果
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Actionable comments posted: 5
🧹 Nitpick comments (2)
src/main/java/org/joychou/controller/Rce2.java (2)
117-120: 使用 SafeConstructor 依旧需要注意附加安全策略
虽然此处已改用new SafeConstructor()，但在加载不受信任的 YAML 时，仍需保证类型白名单或额外的安全校验，以彻底阻止潜在的反序列化攻击。
134-136: 建议在主方法中完善异常处理或移除此测试用逻辑
Runtime.getRuntime().exec("touch /tmp/x")未对执行结果进行检查，且无明显业务意义。若此逻辑仅用于本地开发测试，建议在生产环境移除，或补充异常处理以防止执行失败时出现未知错误。
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📒 Files selected for processing (1)
src/main/java/org/joychou/controller/Rce2.java(1 hunks)
🧰 Additional context used
🪛 GitHub Check: SonarCloud
src/main/java/org/joychou/controller/Rce2.java
[failure] 36-36: OS commands should not be vulnerable to command injection attacks
Change this code to not construct the OS command from user-controlled data.See more on SonarQube Cloud
[failure] 69-69: OS commands should not be vulnerable to command injection attacks
Change this code to not construct the OS command from user-controlled data.See more on SonarQube Cloud
[failure] 100-100: Dynamic code execution should not be vulnerable to injection attacks
Change this code to not dynamically execute code influenced by user-controlled data.See more on SonarQube Cloud
| public void yarm(String content) { | ||
| Yaml y = new Yaml(); | ||
| y.load(content); | ||
| } |
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通过不安全的构造器加载 YAML 或导致任意代码执行
使用 new Yaml() 加载未受控内容时，可能触发反序列化漏洞或其他任意代码执行风险（尤其在 org.yaml.snakeyaml 旧版本中）。如需解析复杂数据结构，应启用更严格的限制或使用 SafeConstructor 并进一步加强类型白名单。
| public void groovyshell(String content) { | ||
| GroovyShell groovyShell = new GroovyShell(); | ||
| groovyShell.evaluate(content); | ||
| } |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
动态执行 Groovy 脚本存在远程代码执行风险
GroovyShell 可执行任意自定义脚本。若用户可控制 content，将存在高危RCE。应视具体需求对脚本进行严格限制或考虑移除此功能。
| public void jsEngine(String jsurl) throws Exception{ | ||
| // js nashorn javascript ecmascript | ||
| ScriptEngine engine = new ScriptEngineManager().getEngineByName("js"); | ||
| Bindings bindings = engine.getBindings(ScriptContext.ENGINE_SCOPE); | ||
| String cmd = String.format("load(\"%s\")", jsurl); | ||
| engine.eval(cmd, bindings); | ||
| } |
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动态执行JS脚本存在严重安全隐患
jsEngine 方法从外部 URL 加载并执行 JavaScript，这为攻击者提供了远程任意代码执行的可能。建议彻底审查业务需求，若非必要，不要允许外部脚本的直接加载与执行。
如果确有场景需要运行受信任脚本，建议采用签名校验或严格白名单方式：
String cmd = String.format("load(\"%s\")", jsurl);
-engine.eval(cmd, bindings);
+throw new UnsupportedOperationException("禁止直接加载外部JS，需改用安全方案或白名单。");📝 Committable suggestion
‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.
| public void jsEngine(String jsurl) throws Exception{ | |
| // js nashorn javascript ecmascript | |
| ScriptEngine engine = new ScriptEngineManager().getEngineByName("js"); | |
| Bindings bindings = engine.getBindings(ScriptContext.ENGINE_SCOPE); | |
| String cmd = String.format("load(\"%s\")", jsurl); | |
| engine.eval(cmd, bindings); | |
| } | |
| public void jsEngine(String jsurl) throws Exception{ | |
| // js nashorn javascript ecmascript | |
| ScriptEngine engine = new ScriptEngineManager().getEngineByName("js"); | |
| Bindings bindings = engine.getBindings(ScriptContext.ENGINE_SCOPE); | |
| String cmd = String.format("load(\"%s\")", jsurl); | |
| throw new UnsupportedOperationException("禁止直接加载外部JS，需改用安全方案或白名单。"); | |
| } |
🧰 Tools
🪛 GitHub Check: SonarCloud
[failure] 100-100: Dynamic code execution should not be vulnerable to injection attacks
Change this code to not dynamically execute code influenced by user-controlled data.See more on SonarQube Cloud
| @GetMapping("/runtime/exec") | ||
| public String CommandExec(String cmd) { | ||
| Runtime run = Runtime.getRuntime(); | ||
| StringBuilder sb = new StringBuilder(); | ||
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| try { | ||
| Process p = run.exec(cmd); | ||
| BufferedInputStream in = new BufferedInputStream(p.getInputStream()); | ||
| BufferedReader inBr = new BufferedReader(new InputStreamReader(in)); | ||
| String tmpStr; | ||
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| while ((tmpStr = inBr.readLine()) != null) { | ||
| sb.append(tmpStr); | ||
| } | ||
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| if (p.waitFor() != 0) { | ||
| if (p.exitValue() == 1) | ||
| return "Command exec failed!!"; | ||
| } | ||
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| inBr.close(); | ||
| in.close(); | ||
| } catch (Exception e) { | ||
| return e.toString(); | ||
| } | ||
| return sb.toString(); | ||
| } |
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存在高危的系统命令注入风险（Runtime.exec）
此处直接将用户输入 cmd 传给 Runtime.exec()，可能导致攻击者执行任意命令。建议对输入进行严格校验或移除此功能，并在必要时使用更安全的替代方案（例如预定义的命令白名单）。
以下示例展示如何禁止直接执行来自用户的输入：
public String CommandExec(String cmd) {
- Process p = run.exec(cmd);
+ // TODO: 强制使用安全设计，禁止直接执行用户命令
+ throw new UnsupportedOperationException("禁止传入任意命令执行。请先进行安全改造。");
}Committable suggestion skipped: line range outside the PR's diff.
🧰 Tools
🪛 GitHub Check: SonarCloud
[failure] 36-36: OS commands should not be vulnerable to command injection attacks
Change this code to not construct the OS command from user-controlled data.See more on SonarQube Cloud
| public String processBuilder(String cmd) { | ||
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| StringBuilder sb = new StringBuilder(); | ||
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| try { | ||
| String[] arrCmd = {"/bin/sh", "-c", cmd}; | ||
| ProcessBuilder processBuilder = new ProcessBuilder(arrCmd); | ||
| Process p = processBuilder.start(); | ||
| BufferedInputStream in = new BufferedInputStream(p.getInputStream()); | ||
| BufferedReader inBr = new BufferedReader(new InputStreamReader(in)); | ||
| String tmpStr; | ||
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| while ((tmpStr = inBr.readLine()) != null) { | ||
| sb.append(tmpStr); | ||
| } | ||
| } catch (Exception e) { | ||
| return e.toString(); | ||
| } | ||
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| return sb.toString(); | ||
| } |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
同样存在高危的系统命令注入风险（ProcessBuilder）
与 Runtime.exec 相似，ProcessBuilder 在此处直接使用了用户输入的命令字符串 cmd。若攻击者能控制此参数，则可能导致任意命令执行。应避免基于未经校验的外部输入拼装命令。
可考虑通过以下方式处理：
String[] arrCmd = {"/bin/sh", "-c", cmd};
-ProcessBuilder processBuilder = new ProcessBuilder(arrCmd);
+// TODO: 禁止使用未校验的用户输入进行命令执行
+throw new UnsupportedOperationException("禁止传入任意命令执行。请先进行安全改造。");Committable suggestion skipped: line range outside the PR's diff.
🧰 Tools
🪛 GitHub Check: SonarCloud
[failure] 69-69: OS commands should not be vulnerable to command injection attacks
Change this code to not construct the OS command from user-controlled data.See more on SonarQube Cloud
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| StringBuilder sb = new StringBuilder(); | ||
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| try { | ||
| Process p = run.exec(cmd); |
Check failure
Code scanning / SonarCloud
OS commands should not be vulnerable to command injection attacks
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| try { | ||
| String[] arrCmd = {"/bin/sh", "-c", cmd}; | ||
| ProcessBuilder processBuilder = new ProcessBuilder(arrCmd); |
Check failure
Code scanning / SonarCloud
OS commands should not be vulnerable to command injection attacks
| ScriptEngine engine = new ScriptEngineManager().getEngineByName("js"); | ||
| Bindings bindings = engine.getBindings(ScriptContext.ENGINE_SCOPE); | ||
| String cmd = String.format("load(\"%s\")", jsurl); | ||
| engine.eval(cmd, bindings); |
Check failure
Code scanning / SonarCloud
Dynamic code execution should not be vulnerable to injection attacks
| StringBuilder sb = new StringBuilder(); | ||
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| try { | ||
| Process p = run.exec(cmd); |
Check failure
Code scanning / SonarCloud
OS commands should not be vulnerable to command injection attacks
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| try { | ||
| String[] arrCmd = {"/bin/sh", "-c", cmd}; | ||
| ProcessBuilder processBuilder = new ProcessBuilder(arrCmd); |
Check failure
Code scanning / SonarCloud
OS commands should not be vulnerable to command injection attacks
| ScriptEngine engine = new ScriptEngineManager().getEngineByName("js"); | ||
| Bindings bindings = engine.getBindings(ScriptContext.ENGINE_SCOPE); | ||
| String cmd = String.format("load(\"%s\")", jsurl); | ||
| engine.eval(cmd, bindings); |
Check failure
Code scanning / SonarCloud
Dynamic code execution should not be vulnerable to injection attacks
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