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dryrunsecurity bot commented Apr 2, 2025

DryRun Security Summary

GitHub Actions workflow implements a multi-layered security scanning pipeline with potential security risks related to secret management, external URL exposure, supply chain vulnerabilities, and credential handling.

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Summary: GitHub Actions workflow defines a comprehensive security scanning pipeline with multiple security tools, including static analysis, SCA, DAST, container security, and SAST scans.

Security Findings:
• Sensitive Information Exposure

  • References to SOOS authentication secrets (SOOS_CLIENT_ID and SOOS_API_KEY)
  • Potential risk of secret management if not properly secured

• External URL Exposure

  • DAST scan target URL: https://latio.tech
  • Container image reference: confusedcrib/insecure-ai:latest
  • Risks include potential information disclosure or unintended scanning targets

• Supply Chain Risk

  • OpenGrep tool downloaded directly from GitHub releases using curl
  • Potential compromise of download source could introduce malicious code

• Credential Management Considerations

  • persist_credentials: false used, which limits credential exposure
  • Reduces risk of unintended credential leakage during workflow execution

View PR in the DryRun Dashboard.

name: SOOS SAST Scan
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@master

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Static Code Analysis Risk: Software and Data Integrity Failures - GitHub actions artipacked vulnerability

Detected local filesystem git credential storage on GitHub Actions, as well as potential avenues for unintentional persistence of credentials in artifacts. By default, using actions/checkout causes a credential to be persisted in the checked-out repo's .git/config, so that subsequent git operations can be authenticated. Subsequent steps may accidentally publicly persist .git/config, e.g. by including it in a publicly accessible artifact via actions/upload-artifact. However, even without this, persisting the credential in the .git/config is non-ideal unless actually needed. To fix, add persist-credentials: false inside a with section in this step.

Severity: Medium ⚠️
Status: Open 🔴

References:

  1. https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/github-repo-artifacts-leak-tokens/

Suggested reviewers 🧐: @confusedcrib

Take action by replying with an [arnica] command 💬

Actions

Use [arnica] or [a] to interact with the Arnica bot to acknowledge or dismiss code risks.

[arnica] ack <message>

Acknowledge the finding as a valid code risk.

Examples

[arnica] ack looking into it

[a] ack triaged by the security team

[arnica] dismiss <fp|accept|capacity> <message>

Dismiss the risk with a reason.

  • fp: False positive, i.e. the result is incorrect and indicates no actual risk.

  • accept: Tolerable risk, i.e. risk severity is lower than what has been reported or is accepted as it stands.

  • capacity: No capacity, i.e. leave me alone, please.

Examples

[arnica] dismiss fp test function

[arnica] dismiss accept ChatGPT assures us that we will be just fine

[a] dismiss capacity not enough caffeine to fix it

name: SOOS SCA Scan
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@master

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Static Code Analysis Risk: Software and Data Integrity Failures - GitHub actions artipacked vulnerability

Detected local filesystem git credential storage on GitHub Actions, as well as potential avenues for unintentional persistence of credentials in artifacts. By default, using actions/checkout causes a credential to be persisted in the checked-out repo's .git/config, so that subsequent git operations can be authenticated. Subsequent steps may accidentally publicly persist .git/config, e.g. by including it in a publicly accessible artifact via actions/upload-artifact. However, even without this, persisting the credential in the .git/config is non-ideal unless actually needed. To fix, add persist-credentials: false inside a with section in this step.

Severity: Medium ⚠️
Status: Open 🔴

References:

  1. https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/github-repo-artifacts-leak-tokens/

Suggested reviewers 🧐: @confusedcrib

Take action by replying with an [arnica] command 💬

Actions

Use [arnica] or [a] to interact with the Arnica bot to acknowledge or dismiss code risks.

[arnica] ack <message>

Acknowledge the finding as a valid code risk.

Examples

[arnica] ack looking into it

[a] ack triaged by the security team

[arnica] dismiss <fp|accept|capacity> <message>

Dismiss the risk with a reason.

  • fp: False positive, i.e. the result is incorrect and indicates no actual risk.

  • accept: Tolerable risk, i.e. risk severity is lower than what has been reported or is accepted as it stands.

  • capacity: No capacity, i.e. leave me alone, please.

Examples

[arnica] dismiss fp test function

[arnica] dismiss accept ChatGPT assures us that we will be just fine

[a] dismiss capacity not enough caffeine to fix it

name: SOOS SBOM Scan
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@master

Choose a reason for hiding this comment

The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.

Static Code Analysis Risk: Software and Data Integrity Failures - GitHub actions artipacked vulnerability

Detected local filesystem git credential storage on GitHub Actions, as well as potential avenues for unintentional persistence of credentials in artifacts. By default, using actions/checkout causes a credential to be persisted in the checked-out repo's .git/config, so that subsequent git operations can be authenticated. Subsequent steps may accidentally publicly persist .git/config, e.g. by including it in a publicly accessible artifact via actions/upload-artifact. However, even without this, persisting the credential in the .git/config is non-ideal unless actually needed. To fix, add persist-credentials: false inside a with section in this step.

Severity: Medium ⚠️
Status: Open 🔴

References:

  1. https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/github-repo-artifacts-leak-tokens/

Suggested reviewers 🧐: @confusedcrib

Take action by replying with an [arnica] command 💬

Actions

Use [arnica] or [a] to interact with the Arnica bot to acknowledge or dismiss code risks.

[arnica] ack <message>

Acknowledge the finding as a valid code risk.

Examples

[arnica] ack looking into it

[a] ack triaged by the security team

[arnica] dismiss <fp|accept|capacity> <message>

Dismiss the risk with a reason.

  • fp: False positive, i.e. the result is incorrect and indicates no actual risk.

  • accept: Tolerable risk, i.e. risk severity is lower than what has been reported or is accepted as it stands.

  • capacity: No capacity, i.e. leave me alone, please.

Examples

[arnica] dismiss fp test function

[arnica] dismiss accept ChatGPT assures us that we will be just fine

[a] dismiss capacity not enough caffeine to fix it

@zeropath-ai
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zeropath-ai bot commented Apr 2, 2025

We have finished reviewing your PR. We have found no vulnerabilities.

Reply to this PR with @zeropath-ai followed by a description of what change you want and we'll auto-submit a change to this PR to implement it.

@confusedcrib confusedcrib merged commit 1b1ef6f into main Apr 21, 2025
19 of 22 checks passed
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2 participants