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@asadeddin asadeddin closed this Nov 5, 2025
@asadeddin asadeddin deleted the asadeddin-patch-2 branch November 5, 2025 13:09
Comment on lines 46 to 58
sql = request.form['sql'] #oh o
try:
# Execute the user's SQL query
cursor.execute(sql) #oh o
# Fetch all rows from the query result
rows = cursor.fetchall()
# Format the results for display
if rows:
output = "Results:\n" + "\n".join(str(row) for row in rows)
else:
output = "Query executed successfully, but no results found."
except Exception as e:
output = f"SQL Error: {e}"

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Static Code Analysis Risk: Injection - SQL injection DB cursor execute

User-controlled data from a request is passed to 'execute()'. This could lead to a SQL injection and therefore protected information could be leaked. Instead, use django's QuerySets, which are built with query parameterization and therefore not vulnerable to sql injection. For example, you could use Entry.objects.filter(date=2006).

Severity: Medium ⚠️
Status: Open 🔴

References:

  1. https://docs.djangoproject.com/en/3.0/topics/security/#sql-injection-protection

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@zeropath-ai
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zeropath-ai bot commented Nov 5, 2025

Possible security or compliance issues detected. Reviewed everything up to 8bac70c.

The following issues were found:

  • AWS

  • SQL Injection / Arbitrary Query Execution

    • Location: insecure-app/app.py:49
    • Vulnerability Severity: 9.0
    • Confidence: 10.0
    • Description: Critical SQL injection / arbitrary query execution: the code executes the contents of the sql parameter directly via cursor.execute(sql), allowing an attacker to run any SQL against the application's database (data theft, modification, schema changes). This is an immediate execution of attacker-controlled query text.
    • Link to UI: https://zeropath.com/app/issues/a20626f2-9108-4774-84ec-9da0300dab48
  • Command Injection

    • Location: insecure-app/app.py:31
    • Vulnerability Severity: 9.0
    • Confidence: 10.0
    • Description: Command injection: user-supplied input is passed directly to subprocess.Popen with shell=True, which allows an attacker to execute arbitrary system commands as the application process. Specifically, cmd is taken from request.form and executed with shell=True, enabling shell metacharacter use and command chaining by an attacker.
    • Link to UI: https://zeropath.com/app/issues/df29bf18-4567-44b8-9135-c934154440ec
  • SQL Injection (Unvalidated Input)

    • Location: insecure-app/app.py:46
    • Vulnerability Severity: 8.0
    • Confidence: 9.0
    • Description: Unsafe input handling: the application assigns raw user input from request.form['sql'] to a variable without validation, which is the source for executing arbitrary SQL. Accepting raw SQL from untrusted users enables attackers to craft malicious queries that will be executed by the database.
    • Link to UI: https://zeropath.com/app/issues/6cb617e5-4a1a-4ed6-9d5b-0d9b40c584e8
  • Hardcoded Credentials / Sensitive Data Exposure

    • Location: insecure-app/app.py:10
    • Vulnerability Severity: 8.0
    • Confidence: 9.0
    • Description: Sensitive data exposure: hardcoded AWS secret key is present in the source which causes secret leakage if the repository is shared or deployed. The aws_secret value in code can be harvested and used to sign API requests, leading to full compromise of linked AWS resources.
    • Link to UI: https://zeropath.com/app/issues/717a6929-9bb9-48be-b71a-607024447132
  • Hardcoded Credentials / Sensitive Data Exposure

    • Location: insecure-app/app.py:9
    • Vulnerability Severity: 7.0
    • Confidence: 9.0
    • Description: Sensitive data exposure: hardcoded AWS credentials are present in the source which causes secret leakage if the repository is shared or deployed. These credentials (aws_access_key_id) can be discovered by attackers scanning the repo and can be used to access AWS resources if valid, resulting in account compromise, data theft, or billing impact.
    • Link to UI: https://zeropath.com/app/issues/9261197d-7e99-409b-b7ac-7d02f8358450
  • SQL Injection

    • Location: insecure-app/app.py:23
    • Vulnerability Severity: 6.0
    • Confidence: 7.0
    • Description: SQL injection: using Python string interpolation to construct a SQL query with potentially user-controlled variables is unsafe and can result in SQL injection, allowing an attacker to alter queries, bypass authentication, or exfiltrate/modify data. The line builds a query using "%s" % (username, password) which will inject raw values into the SQL statement.
    • Link to UI: https://zeropath.com/app/issues/91fe8246-6194-4390-9a09-4436ed8aa41f
Security Overview
Detected Code Changes
Change Type Relevant files
Other ► insecure-app/app.py
    Modified AWS credentials
    Added comments to code

Reply to this PR with @zeropath-ai followed by a description of what change you want and we'll auto-submit a change to this PR to implement it.

os.environ['FLASK_ENV'] = 'development'
run_simple('0.0.0.0', 8080, application, use_reloader=True, use_debugger=True)

app.run(host='0.0.0.0', port=8080, debug=True)

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Flask started with debug=True (app.run(..., debug=True)) which leaves framework debug behavior enabled in committed code

Details

🔧 How do I fix it?
Remove debugging statements like console.log, debugger, dd(), or logic bypasses like || true. Keep legitimate logging for monitoring and error handling.

More info - Comment @AikidoSec feedback: [FEEDBACK] to get better review comments in the future.

@app.route('/result', methods=['POST'])
def result():
@app.route('/', methods=['GET', 'POST'])
def index():

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Function index mixes HTTP presentation, database access, OS command execution, file I/O, network requests, and XML parsing in a single route handler.

Details

🔧 How do I fix it?
Split classes that handle database, HTTP, and UI concerns into separate, focused classes.

More info - Comment @AikidoSec feedback: [FEEDBACK] to get better review comments in the future.

<!-- SQL Injection -->
<form action="/" method="post">
<h2>SQL Injection</h2>
<input type="text" name="sql" value="SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = 'admin' OR '1'='1'">

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Added form default uses "SELECT * FROM users ..." (SELECT * retrieves all columns and can expose sensitive data).

Details

✨ AI Reasoning
​​1) The added HTML form default value includes the literal SQL statement "SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = 'admin' OR '1'='1'", which demonstrates use of a SELECT * wildcard in a newly introduced template string.
​2) Embedding a SELECT * pattern is harmful because it encourages queries that retrieve all columns, making code fragile to schema changes and exposing unnecessary/sensitive data.
​3) This is a clear violation of the AIK_AI_no_select_star rule and was introduced by this PR (the form with this default SQL value is newly added).

🔧 How do I fix it?
Explicitly list needed columns in production queries. Use SELECT * only for debugging, exploration, or single-column tables where it's reasonable.

More info - Comment @AikidoSec feedback: [FEEDBACK] to get better review comments in the future.

# 2 - Command Injection
if 'command' in request.form:
cmd = request.form['command']
process = subprocess.Popen(cmd, shell=True, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE) #command injection!

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One-line subprocess.Popen call combines command execution with multiple stdout/stderr and shell=True arguments, making the invocation harder to read and audit.

Details

✨ AI Reasoning
​​1) The code runs an external command by calling subprocess.Popen with several keyword arguments in a single line.
​2) Combining the external command invocation and multiple I/O-related keyword parameters on one line increases cognitive load when reviewing for security and behavior (shell=True, stdout/stderr pipes).
​3) This harms maintainability because it's harder to spot which flags are set and to audit for command injection risks.
​4) Violation is true because the diff added this one-line Popen call.
​5) Confidence is relatively high given the security-sensitive context.

🔧 How do I fix it?
Break long lines to enhance clarity. Aim for a maximum of 80-120 characters per line, depending on the context and coding standards.

More info - Comment @AikidoSec feedback: [FEEDBACK] to get better review comments in the future.

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