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fix: Validate byte inputs before changing endianness #32
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Submitting too large inputs might be a potential DDoS attack vector. Before this change, `hash_bytes_be` was reversing all input byte slices before validating them (to convert them from big-endian to little-endian), so it was prone to an attack, where a malicious user could submit arrays just to DDoS the software using light-poseidon with heavy reversal operations. Also, remove the `fuzz-tests` flag and run all tests by default. After this fix, the runtime of fuzz tests is fast. Its degradation is actually an indicator of performance issues or DDoS attack vectors. Fix that by performing validation as the first operation on byte inputs. Kudos to @samkim-crypto for finding the issue. Ref: solana-labs/solana#33363
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ananas-block
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Oct 29, 2023
samkim-crypto
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Nov 10, 2023
That new release contains an important change which prevents a potential DDoS. * Lightprotocol/light-poseidon#32 Invoking `from_bytes_be` function light-poseidon 0.1.1 inverts all the inputs before performing a check whether their length exceeds the modulus of the prime field. Therefore, it was prone to an attack, where a mailicious user could submit long byte slices just to DDoS the validator, being stuck on inverting large byte sequences. The update and mentioned change fixes the same issue as #33363 aims to address. The new release contains also few other less important changes like: * Lightprotocol/light-poseidon#37 * Lightprotocol/light-poseidon#38 * Lightprotocol/light-poseidon#39
mergify bot
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Nov 28, 2023
That new release contains an important change which prevents a potential DDoS. * Lightprotocol/light-poseidon#32 Invoking `from_bytes_be` function light-poseidon 0.1.1 inverts all the inputs before performing a check whether their length exceeds the modulus of the prime field. Therefore, it was prone to an attack, where a mailicious user could submit long byte slices just to DDoS the validator, being stuck on inverting large byte sequences. The update and mentioned change fixes the same issue as #33363 aims to address. The new release contains also few other less important changes like: * Lightprotocol/light-poseidon#37 * Lightprotocol/light-poseidon#38 * Lightprotocol/light-poseidon#39 (cherry picked from commit 67f8daf) # Conflicts: # Cargo.lock # Cargo.toml # programs/sbf/Cargo.lock
Lichtso
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Nov 28, 2023
That new release contains an important change which prevents a potential DDoS. * Lightprotocol/light-poseidon#32 Invoking `from_bytes_be` function light-poseidon 0.1.1 inverts all the inputs before performing a check whether their length exceeds the modulus of the prime field. Therefore, it was prone to an attack, where a mailicious user could submit long byte slices just to DDoS the validator, being stuck on inverting large byte sequences. The update and mentioned change fixes the same issue as #33363 aims to address. The new release contains also few other less important changes like: * Lightprotocol/light-poseidon#37 * Lightprotocol/light-poseidon#38 * Lightprotocol/light-poseidon#39 (cherry picked from commit 67f8daf)
samkim-crypto
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Dec 8, 2023
…4247) chore: Update light-poseidon to 0.2.0 (#33923) That new release contains an important change which prevents a potential DDoS. * Lightprotocol/light-poseidon#32 Invoking `from_bytes_be` function light-poseidon 0.1.1 inverts all the inputs before performing a check whether their length exceeds the modulus of the prime field. Therefore, it was prone to an attack, where a mailicious user could submit long byte slices just to DDoS the validator, being stuck on inverting large byte sequences. The update and mentioned change fixes the same issue as #33363 aims to address. The new release contains also few other less important changes like: * Lightprotocol/light-poseidon#37 * Lightprotocol/light-poseidon#38 * Lightprotocol/light-poseidon#39 (cherry picked from commit 67f8daf) Co-authored-by: vadorovsky <[email protected]>
crossdev24
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Jun 24, 2024
That new release contains an important change which prevents a potential DDoS. * Lightprotocol/light-poseidon#32 Invoking `from_bytes_be` function light-poseidon 0.1.1 inverts all the inputs before performing a check whether their length exceeds the modulus of the prime field. Therefore, it was prone to an attack, where a mailicious user could submit long byte slices just to DDoS the validator, being stuck on inverting large byte sequences. The update and mentioned change fixes the same issue as #33363 aims to address. The new release contains also few other less important changes like: * Lightprotocol/light-poseidon#37 * Lightprotocol/light-poseidon#38 * Lightprotocol/light-poseidon#39
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Submitting too large inputs might be a potential DDoS attack vector. Before this change,
hash_bytes_bewas reversing all input byte slices before validating them (to convert them from big-endian to little-endian), so it was prone to an attack, where a malicious user could submit arrays just to DDoS the software using light-poseidon with heavy reversal operations.Fix that by performing validation as the first operation on byte inputs.
Also, remove the
fuzz-testsflag and run all tests by default. After this fix, the runtime of fuzz tests is fast. Its degradation is actually an indicator of performance issues or DDoS attack vectors.Kudos to @samkim-crypto for finding the issue.
Ref: solana-labs/solana#33363