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Enable any community contributor to submit a new recipe PR with a signed evidence bundle that lets AICR maintainers approve the recipe without re-running validation themselves. AICR maintainers don't have access to every CSP, NCP, ISV platform, or accelerator — the recipe author does. This epic builds the framework that converts the author's local test run into a verifiable artifact a maintainer can trust.
Why this matters
Maintainer reachability gap. AICR ships recipes for AWS / OCI / GCP / Azure / CoreWeave / Forge / on-prem combinations spanning H100 / GB200 / B200 / MI300 / various OS and intent variants. No single team has hands-on access to all of them. Today this is either a blocker for community contributions or a leap of faith for reviewers.
The recipe already self-defines its tests.validation, componentRefs, criteria, and the existing aicr validate pipeline mean "did the recipe pass" is already a well-formed, machine-checkable question. We don't need to extend the recipe spec — we need to package the answer.
Trust transfer, not test reproduction. The contributor runs aicr validate against real hardware they have access to. AICR's tooling cryptographically packages the recipe + snapshot + per-phase results + BOM into a signed bundle. The maintainer (or CI) verifies the bundle and reads a Markdown summary. The artifact is the trust handoff.
Every bundle is an in-toto attestation with a custom AICR predicate, signed with cosign keyless OIDC (KMS support is a future extension). The predicate carries:
The canonical recipe YAML (post-overlay resolution)
The cluster snapshot, including a fingerprint (detected service, accelerator, OS, k8s-version)
A community contributor can submit a recipe PR including a signed evidence-bundle.tar.gz.
aicr verify-evidence validates the bundle locally and via CI.
A GitHub Action runs verify on every recipe PR and posts a structured Markdown summary as a review comment.
The bundle format is publicly documented and versioned so third parties can verify without AICR.
CONTRIBUTING.md describes the workflow end-to-end with a worked example.
AICR maintainers can approve a recipe PR for hardware they don't physically have, on the strength of the bundle + verification report.
Out of scope
Auto-merging recipe PRs based on evidence. Evidence is a verifiable input to maintainer judgment, not a replacement for it.
Extending the recipe schema with new "acceptance criteria" fields. The recipe already self-defines its tests — we're packaging the result, not redefining what passing means.
Hosting/storing third-party bundles long-term. The bundle is a PR artifact; cosign + Rekor provide the durable record.
Sequencing
Foundation Verification Community workflow
─────────── ────────────── ──────────────────
#752 fingerprint ──┐
├──► #754 bundle + emit ──► #753 verify-evidence ──► #751 PR template + CI gate
(snapshot work)
#754 (bundle format) depends on #752 (fingerprint) being trustworthy. #753 (verify-evidence) depends on #754. #751 (community workflow) wraps #753.
Goal
Enable any community contributor to submit a new recipe PR with a signed evidence bundle that lets AICR maintainers approve the recipe without re-running validation themselves. AICR maintainers don't have access to every CSP, NCP, ISV platform, or accelerator — the recipe author does. This epic builds the framework that converts the author's local test run into a verifiable artifact a maintainer can trust.
Why this matters
validation,componentRefs,criteria, and the existingaicr validatepipeline mean "did the recipe pass" is already a well-formed, machine-checkable question. We don't need to extend the recipe spec — we need to package the answer.aicr validateagainst real hardware they have access to. AICR's tooling cryptographically packages the recipe + snapshot + per-phase results + BOM into a signed bundle. The maintainer (or CI) verifies the bundle and reads a Markdown summary. The artifact is the trust handoff.Architecture
Bundle anatomy
Every bundle is an in-toto attestation with a custom AICR predicate, signed with cosign keyless OIDC (KMS support is a future extension). The predicate carries:
In-toto + cosign gives us sigstore-native verification today and keeps the door open for SLSA Verification Summary Attestation (VSA) interop later.
Child issues
Foundation
aicr validate --emit-evidenceVerification surface
aicr verify-evidencecommand for reviewers and CICommunity workflow
Related issues (not children, but contributing)
aicr validate --phase deployment#660 — Reuse Chainsaw health checks inaicr validate --phase deployment(deeper deployment evidence = higher-quality bundle content)Hard dependency
Definition of done
evidence-bundle.tar.gz.aicr verify-evidencevalidates the bundle locally and via CI.Out of scope
Sequencing
#754 (bundle format) depends on #752 (fingerprint) being trustworthy. #753 (verify-evidence) depends on #754. #751 (community workflow) wraps #753.