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All three findings addressed on bug_fix_2:
  P2 — signed_scoped_anchors_full_did_form_matches_stored_slug_through_build_router now seeds
  a second repo under a different owner and asserts irys-other-repo-tx is absent. Negative
  control: flipping the production filter to None made the test go RED with count: 2 showing
  the cross-repo leak.

  P3 — let short = owner_did.split(':').next_back().unwrap() replaced with let short =
  crate::db::normalize_owner_key(&owner_did).to_string(). Reader and writer now share one
  convention.

  P3 — PR #134 description updated: pins bullet now describes the actual pre-merge layering
  (and cites the axum-layer-vs-merge-pitfall memory entry), and round 2's stored-slug
  normalization is added as its own bullet with the regression's coverage.

  5/5 anchor-related tests pass, cargo fmt --check clean.
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Gravirei committed Aug 30, 2026
commit ac9ea619279ba67f79b3ba2126736bef0ee04a5e
51 changes: 50 additions & 1 deletion crates/gitlawb-node/src/server.rs
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -932,7 +932,13 @@ mod tests {
let mut repo = seed_repo_inline(&owner_did, "scoped-did-form");
repo.is_public = false;
state.db.create_repo(&repo).await.expect("seed repo");
let short = owner_did.split(':').next_back().unwrap().to_string();
// Use the same slug-construction the writer uses
// (`db::normalize_owner_key`) so the test reader and the production
// writer can't drift if a future change moves the slug off the
// short-form. P3 (reviewer-3): the previous `split(':').next_back()`
// hand-rolled a third convention that agreed with the writer for
// `did:key` owners and diverged for every other method.
let short = crate::db::normalize_owner_key(&owner_did).to_string();
state
.db
.record_arweave_anchor(&crate::db::RecordAnchorInput {
Expand All @@ -949,6 +955,43 @@ mod tests {
.await
.expect("seed anchor");

// P2 (reviewer-3): the previous suite only proved the authorized
// row is present. A correct filter must ALSO prove that anchors
// for OTHER repos do not leak into the response — the failure
// mode of the original bug was a cross-repo leak, not a
// fail-safe empty page. Seed a second repo (also under the
// same owner, so the authz test stays scoped) with its own
// irys_tx_id and assert it is absent from the body.
let other_owner = {
let kp2 = Keypair::generate();
kp2.did().to_string()
};
let mut other_repo = seed_repo_inline(&other_owner, "other-repo");
other_repo.is_public = true;
state
.db
.create_repo(&other_repo)
.await
.expect("seed other repo");
state
.db
.record_arweave_anchor(&crate::db::RecordAnchorInput {
repo: &format!(
"{}/other-repo",
crate::db::normalize_owner_key(&other_owner)
),
owner_did: &other_owner,
ref_name: "refs/heads/main",
old_sha: "0".repeat(64).as_str(),
new_sha: "2".repeat(64).as_str(),
cid: Some("bafyother"),
irys_tx_id: "irys-other-repo-tx",
arweave_url: "https://arweave.net/other-tx",
node_did: "did:key:zNODE",
})
.await
.expect("seed other anchor");

// The caller passes the FULL DID form in ?repo=. validate_repo_slug
// accepts it, authorize_repo_read resolves it, and the handler MUST
// then translate to the canonical stored slug (short form) before
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -981,6 +1024,12 @@ mod tests {
a false-empty page would break callers that pass ?repo=did:key:…/name. \
body was: {body}"
);
assert!(
!body.contains("irys-other-repo-tx"),
"the scoped anchor filter must exclude other repos' anchors — \
a cross-repo leak would expose metadata of repos the caller \
did not authorize. body was: {body}"
);

let _ = repo;
}
Expand Down
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