Skip to content
Closed
Changes from 1 commit
Commits
File filter

Filter by extension

Filter by extension

Conversations
Failed to load comments.
Loading
Jump to
Jump to file
Failed to load files.
Loading
Diff view
Diff view
Prev Previous commit
test(attest): lock the strict batch policies with an error-propagatio…
…n test

AcceptKnown and RejectUnknown were only exercised per-attestation, so a
cleanup applying RequireAll's filter_map(Result::ok) shape to the strict
arms would fail open with every test green. Drive both policies through
verify_all with a wrong-cert-hash member and assert the batch surfaces
the underlying error. Also correct the RequireAll doc: unknown valid
types are retained as unverified, not dropped — only real Err paths are.
  • Loading branch information
kevincodex1 committed Aug 31, 2026
commit 2b1141937342801788de8f3e89a433ae8638c0c3
53 changes: 45 additions & 8 deletions crates/gitlawb-attest/src/verifier.rs
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -147,14 +147,19 @@ impl Registry {
/// Verify a batch, then enforce `RequireAll`.
///
/// Under [`Policy::RequireAll`] this never short-circuits: an attestation
/// that fails to verify — bad signature, cert-hash mismatch, malformed
/// payload, or a type with no verifier — is dropped from the result rather
/// than aborting the batch. Any third party can attach an attestation, so a
/// hard error here would let an unrelated `attacker/spam/v1` deny-of-service
/// the whole cert (the DoS vector the module docstring warns about). The
/// `required_types` check below is the real gate, and it only counts
/// `fully_verified` entries — so a required type represented solely by a
/// malformed attestation still fails with [`Error::RequiredMissing`].
/// that fails to verify — bad signature, cert-hash mismatch, or malformed
/// payload, the actual `Err` paths of [`Registry::verify`] — is dropped
/// from the result rather than aborting the batch. A valid attestation of
/// a type with NO registered verifier is not one of those: under
/// `RequireAll` it verifies to `Ok` with `fully_verified: false` and stays
/// in the result, preserving the distinction between *untrusted* and
/// *invalid* (see `require_all_is_lenient_on_unknown_types_in_the_batch`).
/// Any third party can attach an attestation, so a hard error here would
/// let an unrelated `attacker/spam/v1` deny-of-service the whole cert (the
/// DoS vector the module docstring warns about). The `required_types`
/// check below is the real gate, and it only counts `fully_verified`
/// entries — so a required type represented solely by a malformed
/// attestation still fails with [`Error::RequiredMissing`].
///
/// Under `AcceptKnown` and `RejectUnknown` the batch stays strict: the
/// first verification error is surfaced to the caller.
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -339,6 +344,38 @@ mod tests {
.any(|v| v.type_ == "other/v1" && !v.fully_verified));
}

/// The strict policies must surface a batch member's verification error
/// through `verify_all`, not launder it into a partial result. This binds
/// the POLICY BOUNDARY itself: only the `RequireAll` arm may drop failing
/// entries, and an apparently harmless cleanup that applies its
/// `filter_map(Result::ok)` shape to the strict arms would silently turn
/// the fail-closed contracts into fail-open — with every per-attestation
/// `verify` test still green, because none of them go through the batch
/// path. The failing entry is a wrong-cert-hash attestation (signed over a
/// different hash than the batch expects), a genuine `Err` under every
/// policy.
#[test]
fn strict_policies_propagate_a_batch_members_error() {
let sk = fresh();
let cert_hash = sample_hash();
let mut wrong_hash = sample_hash();
wrong_hash[0] ^= 0xff;

for policy in [Policy::AcceptKnown, Policy::RejectUnknown] {
let mut reg = Registry::new().with_policy(policy);
reg.register(DemoVerifier);
let good = signed_demo(&sk, cert_hash, "ok");
let bad = signed_demo(&sk, wrong_hash, "ok");
let err = reg
.verify_all(&[good, bad], cert_hash)
.expect_err("a strict policy must fail the whole batch");
assert!(
matches!(err, Error::Signature(_) | Error::CertHashMismatch),
"expected the underlying verification error, got {err:?}"
);
}
}

/// A required type that is present but unverified (no verifier registered
/// even though the type appears in `required_types`) must fail
/// `verify_all` with `RequiredMissing`. Catches a misconfiguration where
Expand Down
Loading