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fix(gl,node): normalize stored web_url and reject userinfo (#370 review)
Two P2s from the #370 review addressed at the configuration boundary.

`Config::validate()` now rewrites `self.web_url` to the canonical
`url::Url::to_string()` after `validate_web_url` succeeds, so the
regular and degraded `GET /` handlers advertise the same string that
was actually validated instead of the operator-typed one. The CLI
trims a second time in `fetch_node_web_url`, which hid the divergence
on the View: line, but any other consumer parsing `web_url` directly
would see a non-canonical base. `validate` is now `&mut self` to
carry the write; the one non-test caller already binds `mut` and the
two test bindings are updated to match.

Both `validate_web_url` (node) and `fetch_node_web_url` (CLI) now
reject URLs with a non-empty username or a password: the configured
value is published on public `GET /` and reprinted on the View: line,
so an accidentally configured `https://user:secret@example.com`
would land in public metadata, terminal scrollback, and CI logs.
New regression tests cover user-only and user+password forms on both
sides, plus a normalization test that the stored value matches the
canonical form (with and without operator padding).
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Gravirei committed Aug 28, 2026
commit 10da6f6b06b6633ebba52f6d903248d7d2d37d24
95 changes: 88 additions & 7 deletions crates/gitlawb-node/src/config.rs
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -734,7 +734,13 @@ impl Config {
/// Cross-field boot validation. Single-field ranges are enforced by clap; this
/// catches combinations that ship a denial-of-service under otherwise-valid
/// values. Call once at startup and fail fast on `Err`.
pub fn validate(&self) -> Result<(), String> {
///
/// `&mut self` is required so the validator can normalize `web_url` to
/// its canonical form after validation: the configured value is
/// advertised on public `GET /`, and any consumer reading
/// `config.web_url` later must see the same string that was actually
/// validated.
pub fn validate(&mut self) -> Result<(), String> {
// A write pins one pooled connection for its whole duration (the
// connection-affine advisory lock in repo_store::acquire_write), and
// concurrent writes are capped at max_concurrent_git_pushes. If the pool
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -768,17 +774,35 @@ impl Config {
));
}
}
// Normalize to one canonical form so every consumer (the regular
// and degraded `GET /` handlers, anyone who reads
// `config.web_url` directly) sees the same string that was
// actually validated. The CLI's own defensive trim would paper
// over the divergence on the `View:` line, but that hides the
// bug from any other consumer that parses the value verbatim.
let canonical = raw
.trim()
.parse::<url::Url>()
.map(|u| u.to_string())
.map_err(|_| "is not a valid absolute URL".to_string())?;
if canonical != *raw {
self.web_url = Some(canonical);
}
}
Ok(())
}
}

/// Validate a `web_url` value for use as a browser-reachable base URL.
/// Blank values are rejected (clap maps `--web-url ""` to `Some("")`), and
/// non-blank values must parse as absolute `http`/`https` URLs with no query
/// or fragment — the CLI treats this as a string prefix to append paths to,
/// so anything else produces links no browser can follow (`?a=1/owner/repo`
/// puts the repo path inside the query string).
/// non-blank values must parse as absolute `http`/`https` URLs with no
/// query, fragment, or userinfo — the CLI treats this as a string prefix
/// to append paths to, so anything else produces links no browser can
/// follow (`?a=1/owner/repo` puts the repo path inside the query string);
/// and userinfo is rejected outright because the configured value is
/// published on public `GET /` and reprinted on the CLI's `View:` line,
/// so an accidentally configured password would land in public metadata,
/// terminal scrollback, and CI logs.
pub(crate) fn validate_web_url(raw: &str) -> Result<(), String> {
if raw.trim().is_empty() {
return Err("must not be empty or whitespace-only".into());
Expand All @@ -803,6 +827,12 @@ pub(crate) fn validate_web_url(raw: &str) -> Result<(), String> {
"must not contain a fragment — it is used as a path prefix for View links".into(),
);
}
if !parsed.username().is_empty() || parsed.password().is_some() {
return Err(
"must not contain a username or password — it is advertised publicly and printed on the View: line"
.into(),
);
}
Ok(())
}

Expand Down Expand Up @@ -1431,7 +1461,7 @@ mod tests {
.expect("default config must validate");

// An under-sized pool relative to the push cap is rejected (20 < 32 + 8).
let under = Config::parse_from([
let mut under = Config::parse_from([
"gitlawb-node",
"--db-max-connections",
"20",
Expand All @@ -1444,7 +1474,7 @@ mod tests {
);

// Exactly at the floor validates (40 == 32 + 8).
let at_floor = Config::parse_from([
let mut at_floor = Config::parse_from([
"gitlawb-node",
"--db-max-connections",
"40",
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -1527,6 +1557,57 @@ mod tests {
let mut cfg = Config::parse_from(["gitlawb-node"]);
cfg.web_url = Some("http://localhost:8080/ui".into());
assert!(cfg.validate().is_ok(), "port+path web_url must validate");

// Userinfo must be rejected: `web_url` is published on public
// `GET /` and reprinted on the CLI's `View:` line, so an
// accidentally configured password would land in public metadata,
// terminal scrollback, and CI logs. Reject username-only and
// user+password forms.
for bad in [
"https://user@example.com",
"https://user:secret@example.com",
"https://:secret@example.com",
] {
let mut cfg = Config::parse_from(["gitlawb-node"]);
cfg.web_url = Some(bad.into());
assert!(
cfg.validate().is_err(),
"web_url {bad:?} (userinfo) must be rejected"
);
}
}

/// `validate()` accepts whitespace-padded input but the stored value
/// must match the canonical form actually validated, so every consumer
/// (the regular and degraded `GET /` handlers, anyone who reads
/// `config.web_url` directly) sees the same string. Without this, an
/// operator that sets `GITLAWB_WEB_URL=" https://git.example "` boots
/// a node that advertises `" https://git.example "` on public
/// metadata — different from what was validated, different from what
/// any other consumer would parse.
#[test]
fn web_url_is_normalized_to_canonical_form_after_validation() {
// Padded input is rewritten to the canonical form. `url::Url`'s
// own `to_string` is what we use for the canonicalization, and
// it always appends a path-separator slash to a bare-host URL,
// so the stored value is `https://git.example/` (which is also
// what every browser would normalize the operator-typed form to).
let mut cfg = Config::parse_from(["gitlawb-node"]);
cfg.web_url = Some(" https://git.example ".into());
cfg.validate().unwrap();
assert_eq!(
cfg.web_url.as_deref(),
Some("https://git.example/"),
"stored web_url must be the canonical form, not the operator-typed one"
);

// Already-canonical input is left alone after a no-op
// re-normalization — same form comes back out, so any consumer
// reading the stored value sees a stable string across calls.
let mut cfg = Config::parse_from(["gitlawb-node"]);
cfg.web_url = Some("https://git.example/".into());
cfg.validate().unwrap();
assert_eq!(cfg.web_url.as_deref(), Some("https://git.example/"));
}

/// The DECLARED default, read off the parser rather than out of a parse.
Expand Down
34 changes: 34 additions & 0 deletions crates/gl/src/repo.rs
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -283,6 +283,13 @@ pub(crate) async fn fetch_node_web_url(node: &str) -> Option<String> {
Ok(parsed) if parsed.query().is_some() || parsed.fragment().is_some() => {
Some("contains a query or fragment")
}
// userinfo is rejected because the `View:` line prints the
// value verbatim; a remote advertisement carrying
// `user:pass@host` would land that credential in terminal
// scrollback and CI logs.
Ok(parsed) if !parsed.username().is_empty() || parsed.password().is_some() => {
Some("contains a username or password")
}
Ok(_) => None,
}
};
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -1100,6 +1107,33 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(web_url.as_deref(), Some("http://localhost:8080/ui"));
}

/// A remote node that advertises `web_url` with userinfo (`user@`,
/// `user:pass@`) must be dropped: the value is reprinted on the `View:`
/// line, and a credential embedded in the URL would land in terminal
/// scrollback and CI logs. Mirrors the node-side boot validation.
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_fetch_node_web_url_rejects_userinfo() {
for bad in [
"https://user@example.com",
"https://user:secret@example.com",
] {
let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
let _m = server
.mock("GET", "/")
.with_status(200)
.with_header("content-type", "application/json")
.with_body(format!(r#"{{"web_url":"{}"}}"#, bad))
.create_async()
.await;

let web_url = fetch_node_web_url(&server.url()).await;
assert_eq!(
web_url, None,
"web_url with userinfo {bad:?} must be rejected"
);
}
}

/// A non-success status must still return None (View link is cosmetic) but
/// the status surfaces as a user-visible stderr warning instead of being
/// swallowed silently (#370 review).
Expand Down
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