Add packed attestation verification

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -4,7 +4,11 @@ All notable changes to this project will be documented in this file.
 The format is based on [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.0.0/),
 and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0.html).
 
-## [0.3.0] - 2020-01-21]
+## [0.4.0] - 2020-01-25
+### Added
+- Attestation verification for the _packed_ format has been added, continuing the previous guidance for trust chain validation. ECDAA attestation type is not supported due to lack of ECDAA support in Go standard library.
+
+## [0.3.0] - 2020-01-21
 ### Added
 - Attestation verification for the _fido-u2f_ format has been added. The attestation type and trust path are __not__ validated, only the signature against the provided certificate. It is up to the implementor to verify the trust chain using the `*AttestationObject` returned from `FinishRegistration`.
 ### Changed
@@ -18,7 +22,6 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0
 ### Added
 - `UnmarshalBinary` and `MarshalBinary` methods on `AttestationObject` and `AuthenticatorData`, implementing the `BinaryMarshaler` and `BinaryUnmarshaler` interfaces
 - `Encode` method on `AuthenticatorData` to facilitate encoding `AttestationObject` for storage
-
 ### Changed
 - **[BREAKING]** `FinishRegistration` now returns `(*AttestationObject, error)` instead of `(string, []byte, error)`, to allow the implementor to choose how much or little of the authenticator data to save.
 - **[BREAKING]** `FinishAuthentication` now returns `(*AuthenticatorData, error)` instead of `(uint, error)`, to allow the implementor full access to the authenticator data for other uses

README.md

@@ -225,8 +225,8 @@ _warp_ was built with the following goals in mind:
   * Supported: ES256, ES384, ES512, EdDSA, RS1, RS256, RS384, RS512, PS256, PS384, PS512
   * To be implemented: None plannned
 * Attestation formats
-  * Supported: _fido-u2f_, _none_
-  * To be implemented: _packed_, _tpm_, _android-key_, _android-safetynet_
+  * Supported: _packed, _fido-u2f_, _none_
+  * To be implemented: _tpm_, _android-key_, _android-safetynet_
 * Defined extensions
   * Supported: _appid_
   * To be implemented: _txAuthSimple_, _txAuthGeneric_, _authnSel_, _exts_, _uvi_, _loc_, _uvm_, _biometricPerfBounds_

attestation.go

@@ -5,10 +5,13 @@ import (
 	"crypto/ecdsa"
 	"crypto/elliptic"
 	"crypto/x509"
+	"encoding/asn1"
 
 	"github.com/fxamacker/cbor"
 )
 
+var idFidoGenCeAaguid asn1.ObjectIdentifier = asn1.ObjectIdentifier([]int{1, 3, 6, 1, 4, 1, 45724, 1, 1, 4})
+
 //AttestationObject contains both authenticator data and an attestation
 //statement.
 type AttestationObject struct {
@@ -92,6 +95,150 @@ func VerifyNoneAttestationStatement(attStmt []byte, _ []byte, _ [32]byte) error
 	return nil
 }
 
+//PackedAttestationStatement represents a decoded attestation statement of type
+//"packed"
+type PackedAttestationStatement struct {
+	Alg        COSEAlgorithmIdentifier `cbor:"alg"`
+	Sig        []byte                  `cbor:"sig"`
+	X5C        [][]byte                `cbor:"x5c"`
+	ECDAAKeyID []byte                  `cbor:"ecdaaKeyId"`
+}
+
+var coseToSigAlg = map[COSEAlgorithmIdentifier]x509.SignatureAlgorithm{
+	AlgorithmES256: x509.ECDSAWithSHA256,
+	AlgorithmES384: x509.ECDSAWithSHA384,
+	AlgorithmES512: x509.ECDSAWithSHA512,
+	AlgorithmEdDSA: x509.PureEd25519,
+	AlgorithmPS256: x509.SHA256WithRSAPSS,
+	AlgorithmPS384: x509.SHA384WithRSAPSS,
+	AlgorithmPS512: x509.SHA512WithRSAPSS,
+	AlgorithmRS1:   x509.SHA1WithRSA,
+	AlgorithmRS256: x509.SHA256WithRSA,
+	AlgorithmRS384: x509.SHA384WithRSA,
+	AlgorithmRS512: x509.SHA512WithRSA,
+}
+
+//VerifyPackedAttestationStatement verifies that an attestation statement of
+//type "packed" is valid
+func VerifyPackedAttestationStatement(attStmt []byte, rawAuthData []byte, clientDataHash [32]byte) error {
+	//1. Verify that attStmt is valid CBOR conforming to the syntax defined
+	//above and perform CBOR decoding on it to extract the contained fields.
+	var att PackedAttestationStatement
+	if err := cbor.Unmarshal(attStmt, &att); err != nil {
+		return ErrVerifyAttestation.Wrap(NewError("packed attestation statement not valid CBOR").Wrap(err))
+	}
+
+	authData := AuthenticatorData{}
+	if err := authData.UnmarshalBinary(rawAuthData); err != nil {
+		return ErrVerifyAttestation.Wrap(NewError("error unmarshaling authData"))
+	}
+
+	verificationData := append(rawAuthData, clientDataHash[:]...)
+
+	if len(att.X5C) > 0 {
+		//2. If x5c is present, this indicates that the attestation type is not
+		//ECDAA. In this case:
+
+		//Verify that sig is a valid signature over the concatenation of
+		//authenticatorData and clientDataHash using the attestation public key in
+		//attestnCert with the algorithm specified in alg.
+		attestnCert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(att.X5C[0])
+		if err != nil {
+			return ErrVerifyAttestation.Wrap(NewError("error parsing attestation certificate").Wrap(err))
+		}
+
+		sigAlg, ok := coseToSigAlg[att.Alg]
+		if !ok {
+			return ErrVerifyAttestation.Wrap(NewError("unsupported signature algorithm").Wrap(err))
+		}
+		if err = attestnCert.CheckSignature(sigAlg, verificationData, att.Sig); err != nil {
+			return ErrVerifyAttestation.Wrap(NewError("error verifying signature over auth and client data").Wrap(err))
+		}
+
+		//Verify that attestnCert meets the requirements in §8.2.1 Packed
+		//Attestation Statement Certificate Requirements.
+
+		//Version MUST be set to 3 (which is indicated by an ASN.1 INTEGER with
+		//value 2).
+		if attestnCert.Version != 3 {
+			return ErrVerifyAttestation.Wrap(NewError("invalid attestation certificate version"))
+		}
+
+		//Subject field MUST be set to:
+		//
+		// * Subject-C
+		// ISO 3166 code specifying the country where the Authenticator vendor is incorporated (PrintableString)
+		// * Subject-O
+		// Legal name of the Authenticator vendor (UTF8String)
+		// * Subject-OU
+		// Literal string “Authenticator Attestation” (UTF8String)
+		// * Subject-CN
+		// A UTF8String of the vendor’s choosing
+		if len(attestnCert.Subject.Country) < 1 || len(attestnCert.Subject.Country[0]) < 2 || len(attestnCert.Subject.Country[0]) > 3 {
+			return ErrVerifyAttestation.Wrap(NewError("invalid subject country, must be ISO3166 code"))
+		}
+		if len(attestnCert.Subject.Organization) < 1 {
+			return ErrVerifyAttestation.Wrap(NewError("subject organization not present"))
+		}
+		if len(attestnCert.Subject.OrganizationalUnit) < 1 || attestnCert.Subject.OrganizationalUnit[0] != "Authenticator Attestation" {
+			return ErrVerifyAttestation.Wrap(NewError("invalid subject organizational unit, must be \"Authenticator Attestation\""))
+		}
+		if attestnCert.Subject.CommonName == "" {
+			return ErrVerifyAttestation.Wrap(NewError("subject common name not present"))
+		}
+
+		//If the related attestation root certificate is used for multiple authenticator models, the Extension OID
+		//1.3.6.1.4.1.45724.1.1.4 (id-fido-gen-ce-aaguid) MUST be present, containing the AAGUID as a 16-byte OCTET
+		//STRING. The extension MUST NOT be marked as critical.
+		for _, ext := range attestnCert.Extensions {
+			if ext.Id.Equal(idFidoGenCeAaguid) {
+				if ext.Critical {
+					return ErrVerifyAttestation.Wrap(NewError("AAGUID extension marked critical"))
+				}
+				var certAAGUID []byte
+				_, err := asn1.Unmarshal(ext.Value, &certAAGUID)
+				if err != nil {
+					return ErrVerifyAttestation.Wrap(NewError("error unmarshaling certificate AAGUID").Wrap(err))
+				}
+
+				if !bytes.Equal(certAAGUID, authData.AttestedCredentialData.AAGUID[:]) {
+					return ErrVerifyAttestation.Wrap(NewError("AAGUID mismatch"))
+				}
+			}
+		}
+
+		//The Basic Constraints extension MUST have the CA component set to false.
+		if attestnCert.IsCA {
+			return ErrVerifyAttestation.Wrap(NewError("attestation certificate has CA constraint"))
+		}
+	} else if att.ECDAAKeyID != nil {
+		//3. If ecdaaKeyId is present, then the attestation type is ECDAA.
+		return ErrVerifyAttestation.Wrap(ErrECDAANotSupported)
+	} else {
+		//4. If neither x5c nor ecdaaKeyId is present, self attestation is in
+		//use.
+
+		//Validate that alg matches the algorithm of the credentialPublicKey in
+		//authenticatorData.
+		var credPubKey COSEKey
+		if err := cbor.Unmarshal(authData.AttestedCredentialData.CredentialPublicKey, &credPubKey); err != nil {
+			return ErrVerifyAttestation.Wrap(NewError("error unmarshaling credential public key").Wrap(err))
+		}
+		if credPubKey.Alg != int(att.Alg) {
+			return ErrVerifyAttestation.Wrap(NewError("credential public key algorithm does not match attestation algorithm"))
+		}
+
+		//Verify that sig is a valid signature over the concatenation of
+		//authenticatorData and clientDataHash using the credential public key
+		//with alg.
+		if err := VerifySignature(authData.AttestedCredentialData.CredentialPublicKey, verificationData, att.Sig); err != nil {
+			return ErrVerifyAttestation.Wrap(err)
+		}
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}
+
 //FIDOU2FAttestationStatement represents a decoded attestation statement of type
 //"fido-u2f"
 type FIDOU2FAttestationStatement struct {
@@ -106,7 +253,7 @@ func VerifyFIDOU2FAttestationStatement(attStmt []byte, rawAuthData []byte, clien
 	//above and perform CBOR decoding on it to extract the contained fields.
 	var att FIDOU2FAttestationStatement
 	if err := cbor.Unmarshal(attStmt, &att); err != nil {
-		return ErrVerifyAttestation.Wrap(NewError("fido-u2f attestation statement not valid cbor").Wrap(err))
+		return ErrVerifyAttestation.Wrap(NewError("fido-u2f attestation statement not valid CBOR").Wrap(err))
 	}
 
 	//2. Check that x5c has exactly one element and let attCert be that element.