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2 changes: 1 addition & 1 deletion .codex-plugin/plugin.json
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"name": "codex-multi-auth",
"version": "2.1.13-beta.2",
"version": "2.1.13-beta.3",
"description": "Install and operate codex-multi-auth for the official @openai/codex CLI with multi-account OAuth rotation, switching, health checks, and recovery tools.",
"interface": {
"composerIcon": "./assets/codex-multi-auth-icon.svg"
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2 changes: 1 addition & 1 deletion AGENTS.md
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
Generated: 2026-04-25
Commit: a87e005
Branch: main
Package version: 2.1.13-beta.2
Package version: 2.1.13-beta.3

## OVERVIEW

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2 changes: 1 addition & 1 deletion README.md
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -383,7 +383,7 @@ codex-multi-auth doctor --json

## Release Notes

- Current prerelease: [docs/releases/v2.1.13-beta.2.md](docs/releases/v2.1.13-beta.2.md) — install via `npm i -g codex-multi-auth@beta`
- Current prerelease: [docs/releases/v2.1.13-beta.3.md](docs/releases/v2.1.13-beta.3.md) — install via `npm i -g codex-multi-auth@beta`
- Current stable: [docs/releases/v2.1.12.md](docs/releases/v2.1.12.md)
- Previous stable: [docs/releases/v2.1.11.md](docs/releases/v2.1.11.md)
- Earlier stable: [docs/releases/v2.1.10.md](docs/releases/v2.1.10.md)
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2 changes: 1 addition & 1 deletion docs/README.md
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ Public documentation for the `codex-multi-auth` Codex CLI multi-account OAuth ma

| Document | Focus |
| --- | --- |
| [releases/v2.1.13-beta.2.md](releases/v2.1.13-beta.2.md) | Current prerelease notes (install via `npm i -g codex-multi-auth@beta`) |
| [releases/v2.1.13-beta.3.md](releases/v2.1.13-beta.3.md) | Current prerelease notes (install via `npm i -g codex-multi-auth@beta`) |
| [releases/v2.1.12.md](releases/v2.1.12.md) | Current stable release notes |
| [releases/v2.1.11.md](releases/v2.1.11.md) | Prior stable release notes |
| [releases/v2.1.10.md](releases/v2.1.10.md) | Earlier stable release notes |
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107 changes: 107 additions & 0 deletions docs/releases/v2.1.13-beta.3.md
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
# v2.1.13-beta.3

Beta prerelease that lands the Phase 1 correctness/security audit (#499), the new
`mcodex` launcher + cached statusline (#500), and a round of pre-release
hardening surfaced by a whole-tree stress test (#503). It carries forward the
cascade OAuth token-invalidation fix from v2.1.13-beta.2, the multi-workspace
support from v2.1.13-beta.1, and the pinned-account 503 diagnostic from
v2.1.13-beta.0.

This is a **prerelease**. Stable `v2.1.13` will land once the issue #486 root
cause is identified and patched.

## Install

```bash
npm i -g codex-multi-auth@beta
```

## mcodex launcher (#500)

A lightweight launcher and cached multi-auth status display for Codex sessions.

- `mcodex` — launch Codex with a cached status line printed before startup
(model, reasoning effort, cwd, active account, quota usage, plan, cache age).
- `mcodex --tmux` — launch inside a tmux session with mouse scrollback.
- `mcodex --tmux --live-accounts` — add a live `codex-multi-auth list` monitor pane.
- `mcodex --monitor` — monitor-only mode.

### Status line

- Reads local `quota-cache.json`, `runtime-observability.json`, and account
storage; never calls OpenAI on launch.
- Refreshes quota data in the background only when the cache is stale (default
10 min, `CODEX_MULTI_AUTH_STATUS_QUOTA_REFRESH_INTERVAL_MS`), behind a lock so
concurrent launches don't double-refresh. Stale refresh locks recover after
10 min.
- Resolves the **per-project** account pool when `perProjectAccounts` is enabled
and Codex CLI sync is off (mirrors the runtime's own account scoping), falling
back to the global pool otherwise. Quota/observability stay global.
- Toggle with `CODEX_MULTI_AUTH_STATUSLINE=0`.

### Hardening

- `MCODEX_MONITOR_INTERVAL` / `MCODEX_TMUX_HISTORY_LIMIT` are validated as numeric
before being interpolated into `watch` / tmux commands (no shell injection).
- `--monitor` / `--live-accounts` fail fast with a clear message when `watch`
isn't installed instead of spawning a broken pane.
- The status path resolves `~` correctly on Windows (`path.sep`, not a hardcoded
`/`), and reads the account pool without blocking the event loop.

## Phase 1 audit remediation (#499)

Security and correctness hardening across the runtime, storage, and prompt layers.

### Security

- **Prompt cache integrity.** Cached Codex instructions are SHA-256 verified; a
tampered cache is discarded, and a legacy entry with no recorded digest is
treated as unverified — it is never fast-path served and never drives a
conditional `304` revalidation (which could otherwise launder un-vetted bytes).
A full fetch mints the first digest; old bytes are kept only as an offline
fallback.
- **Path-traversal defense in recovery.** Stored message/part records are
validated before their ids are used to build filesystem paths; a
parseable-but-unsafe id (e.g. `../poison`) or a non-numeric `time.created` is
quarantined instead of escaping into a traversal read or a `NaN` sort.
- **Loopback-only egress.** The runtime rotation proxy and local bridge bind
loopback-only with no opt-out, and never forward inbound client credentials
(`authorization`, `x-api-key`, `cookie`, `proxy-authorization`) upstream
alongside the managed token. IPv6 loopback (`::1` / `[::1]`) is normalized
consistently for both the socket bind and the emitted base URL.
- **Token/email redaction.** Log, debug-bundle, and status sinks mask tokens and
emails; the debug bundle redacts the home prefix (case- and
separator-insensitive on Windows), strips credentials from config values, and
masks the account id.

### Correctness & resilience

- **No event-loop blocking.** Removed synchronous `Atomics.wait` sleeps from the
config load path and the logger's directory-creation retry; both now retry
without freezing the event loop.
- **Bounded network reads.** Prompt and release-metadata fetches are bounded by
connect+body timeouts that actually cancel a stalled body.
- **Windows filesystem resilience.** Account-store WAL/temp writes, temp cleanup,
backup copy/rename, quota-cache, flagged-store, and export operations retry the
shared transient-lock taxonomy (EBUSY/EPERM/ENOTEMPTY/EACCES/EAGAIN) so an
antivirus/indexer/concurrent-reader lock doesn't fail a valid operation or
strand a secret-bearing temp file.
- **Atomic, self-healing account store.** Writes go through a checksummed WAL +
temp-and-rename; a torn write self-heals on the next read.

### CLI

- `codex-multi-auth status` / `list` gained `--json` for machine-readable output,
with a stable shape whether or not accounts are configured.

## Pre-release hardening (#503)

- Strip inbound `cookie` / `proxy-authorization` on both egress paths.
- Bound the proxy's upstream error-body read (previously unbounded on 4xx/5xx).
- Persist `runtime-observability.json` owner-only (`0o600` / dir `0o700`) on POSIX.
- Bump `vitest` to `^4.1.8` (dev-only) to clear GHSA-5xrq-8626-4rwp.

## Verification

Full test suite (4,200+ tests) green; `npm run audit:ci` clean; typecheck and
lint pass.
4 changes: 4 additions & 0 deletions lib/local-bridge.ts
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -98,6 +98,10 @@ function forwardHeaders(headers: Headers, runtimeClientApiKey?: string): Headers
// caller's local credential across the bridge boundary and could change which
// auth the runtime proxy evaluates — strip it unconditionally.
result.delete("x-api-key");
// Same contract: never carry an inbound Cookie / proxy-auth header upstream
// alongside the managed token.
result.delete("cookie");
result.delete("proxy-authorization");
// runtime-proxy-03: present the runtime proxy's client token. We replace the
// inbound client's Authorization (already validated by the bridge) rather than
// forwarding it verbatim, so the bridge can authenticate to an auth-enabled
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11 changes: 10 additions & 1 deletion lib/quota-cache.ts
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -32,7 +32,16 @@ interface QuotaCacheFile {

const QUOTA_CACHE_PATH = join(getCodexMultiAuthDir(), "quota-cache.json");
const QUOTA_CACHE_LABEL = basename(QUOTA_CACHE_PATH);
const RETRYABLE_FS_CODES = new Set(["EBUSY", "EPERM"]);
// Align with the shared FILE_RETRY_CODES taxonomy (lib/fs-retry.ts) so a
// transient Windows lock (AV/indexer/concurrent reader) on the quota cache is
// retried consistently with every other fs path, not just EBUSY/EPERM.
const RETRYABLE_FS_CODES = new Set([
"EBUSY",
"EPERM",
"EAGAIN",
"ENOTEMPTY",
"EACCES",
]);
Comment thread
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Resolved
let quotaCacheWriteQueue: Promise<void> = Promise.resolve();

function isRetryableFsError(error: unknown): boolean {
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69 changes: 63 additions & 6 deletions lib/runtime-rotation-proxy.ts
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -268,6 +268,10 @@ function createOutboundHeaders(
}
headers.delete("host");
headers.delete("x-api-key");
// Never forward inbound client credentials upstream: a Cookie / proxy-auth
// header would ride along with the managed OAuth Bearer to OpenAI.
headers.delete("cookie");
headers.delete("proxy-authorization");
headers.set("authorization", `Bearer ${accessToken}`);
headers.set(OPENAI_HEADERS.ACCOUNT_ID, accountId);
headers.set(OPENAI_HEADERS.BETA, OPENAI_HEADER_VALUES.BETA_RESPONSES);
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -892,9 +896,62 @@ function parseRetryAfterBodyMs(bodyText: string, now: number): number | null {
return null;
}

async function readErrorBody(response: Response): Promise<string> {
async function readErrorBody(
response: Response,
timeoutMs: number,
maxBytes = 1024 * 1024,
): Promise<string> {
// The outbound fetch's abort timer is cleared once headers arrive, so a
// stalled error body would otherwise hang this handler forever (the success
// path is per-chunk stall-bounded; the error path was not). Read the body via
// a reader, bound it by an idle timeout AND a size cap, and cancel the stream
// on timeout/overflow so the socket is released.
const body = response.body;
if (!body || typeof body.getReader !== "function") {
// Fallback for impls without a streamable body: race text() against a timer.
try {
return await withTimeout(
response.text(),
timeoutMs,
() => undefined,
"error body stalled",
);
} catch {
return "";
}
}
const reader = body.getReader();
const chunks: Uint8Array[] = [];
let total = 0;
try {
for (;;) {
let idleTimer: ReturnType<typeof setTimeout> | undefined;
const idle = new Promise<never>((_resolve, reject) => {
idleTimer = setTimeout(
() => reject(new Error("error body stalled")),
Math.max(1, timeoutMs),
);
});
let result: Awaited<ReturnType<typeof reader.read>>;
try {
result = await Promise.race([reader.read(), idle]);
} finally {
if (idleTimer) clearTimeout(idleTimer);
}
if (result.done) break;
if (result.value) {
total += result.value.byteLength;
if (total > maxBytes) break; // cap: enough for diagnostics, no OOM
chunks.push(result.value);
}
}
} catch {
// stalled or errored — fall through with whatever we have
} finally {
await reader.cancel().catch(() => undefined);
}
try {
return await response.text();
return Buffer.concat(chunks).toString("utf8");
} catch {
return "";
}
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -1734,7 +1791,7 @@ export async function startRuntimeRotationProxy(
}

if (upstream.status === HTTP_STATUS.TOO_MANY_REQUESTS) {
const bodyText = await readErrorBody(upstream);
const bodyText = await readErrorBody(upstream, streamStallTimeoutMs);
const retryAfterMs =
parseRetryAfterHeaderMs(upstream.headers, now()) ??
parseRetryAfterBodyMs(bodyText, now()) ??
Expand All @@ -1759,7 +1816,7 @@ export async function startRuntimeRotationProxy(
}

if (upstream.status === 402 || upstream.status === HTTP_STATUS.FORBIDDEN) {
const bodyText = await readErrorBody(upstream);
const bodyText = await readErrorBody(upstream, streamStallTimeoutMs);
const errorCode = extractErrorCodeFromBody(bodyText);
if (isWorkspaceDisabledError(upstream.status, errorCode, bodyText)) {
const accountWasEnabled =
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -1856,7 +1913,7 @@ export async function startRuntimeRotationProxy(
}

if (upstream.status === HTTP_STATUS.UNAUTHORIZED) {
const bodyText = await readErrorBody(upstream);
const bodyText = await readErrorBody(upstream, streamStallTimeoutMs);
accountManager.refundToken(refreshed.account, context.family, context.model);
accountManager.recordFailure(refreshed.account, context.family, context.model);
if (isTokenInvalidationError(bodyText)) {
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -1902,7 +1959,7 @@ export async function startRuntimeRotationProxy(
}

if (upstream.status >= 500) {
await readErrorBody(upstream);
await readErrorBody(upstream, streamStallTimeoutMs);
accountManager.refundToken(refreshed.account, context.family, context.model);
accountManager.recordFailure(refreshed.account, context.family, context.model);
accountManager.markAccountCoolingDown(
Expand Down
25 changes: 23 additions & 2 deletions lib/runtime/runtime-observability.ts
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -195,13 +195,34 @@ function ensureSnapshotState(): RuntimeObservabilitySnapshot {
async function writeSnapshot(snapshot: RuntimeObservabilitySnapshot): Promise<void> {
const dir = getCodexMultiAuthDir();
const path = getSnapshotPath();
await fs.mkdir(dir, { recursive: true });
// The snapshot persists account identifiers (lastAccountId/label/index), so
// keep it owner-only on POSIX like the other sensitive writers (logger,
// local-client-tokens). mode is a no-op on win32 (ACL-based).
await fs.mkdir(dir, { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
// mkdir's mode only applies to a freshly-created dir; an upgrade path with a
// pre-existing multi-auth dir keeps its old (possibly permissive) perms, so
// re-assert 0o700 on POSIX. Only ENOENT is swallowed (the dir was removed by a
// concurrent process — the snapshot write below will recreate/fail as needed);
// any other chmod failure is surfaced rather than silently leaving a
// world-readable dir to hold account ids/labels.
if (process.platform !== "win32") {
try {
await fs.chmod(dir, 0o700);
} catch (error) {
if ((error as NodeJS.ErrnoException | undefined)?.code !== "ENOENT") {
throw error;
}
}
}
Comment thread
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Resolved
let lastError: unknown = null;
for (let attempt = 0; attempt < 3; attempt += 1) {
const tempPath = `${path}.${process.pid}.${Date.now()}.${attempt}.tmp`;
let moved = false;
try {
await fs.writeFile(tempPath, JSON.stringify(snapshot, null, 2), "utf-8");
await fs.writeFile(tempPath, JSON.stringify(snapshot, null, 2), {
encoding: "utf-8",
mode: 0o600,
});
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Resolved
await fs.rename(tempPath, path);
moved = true;
return;
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30 changes: 19 additions & 11 deletions lib/storage.ts
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ import { existsSync, promises as fs, readFileSync } from "node:fs";
import { basename, dirname, join } from "node:path";
import { ACCOUNT_LIMITS } from "./constants.js";
import { StorageError } from "./errors.js";
import { shouldRetryFileOperation, withFileOperationRetry } from "./fs-retry.js";
import { createLogger } from "./logger.js";
import {
exportNamedBackupFile,
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -273,8 +274,7 @@ async function copyFileWithRetry(
return;
}
const canRetry =
(code === "EPERM" || code === "EBUSY") &&
attempt + 1 < BACKUP_COPY_MAX_ATTEMPTS;
shouldRetryFileOperation(error) && attempt + 1 < BACKUP_COPY_MAX_ATTEMPTS;
if (canRetry) {
await new Promise((resolve) =>
setTimeout(resolve, BACKUP_COPY_BASE_DELAY_MS * 2 ** attempt),
Expand All @@ -295,10 +295,8 @@ async function renameFileWithRetry(
await fs.rename(sourcePath, destinationPath);
return;
} catch (error) {
const code = (error as NodeJS.ErrnoException).code;
const canRetry =
(code === "EPERM" || code === "EBUSY" || code === "EAGAIN") &&
attempt + 1 < BACKUP_COPY_MAX_ATTEMPTS;
shouldRetryFileOperation(error) && attempt + 1 < BACKUP_COPY_MAX_ATTEMPTS;
if (!canRetry) {
throw error;
}
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -1834,13 +1832,20 @@ async function saveAccountsUnlocked(storage: AccountStorageV3): Promise<void> {
checksum: computeSha256(content),
content,
};
await fs.writeFile(walPath, JSON.stringify(journalEntry), {
encoding: "utf-8",
mode: 0o600,
});
// Secret-bearing WAL write: retry transient Windows locks via the shared
// taxonomy so a momentary AV/indexer/concurrent-reader lock can't fail an
// otherwise-valid save (EBUSY/EPERM/EAGAIN/ENOTEMPTY/EACCES).
await withFileOperationRetry(() =>
fs.writeFile(walPath, JSON.stringify(journalEntry), {
encoding: "utf-8",
mode: 0o600,
}),
);
},
writeTemp: (tempPath: string, content: string) =>
fs.writeFile(tempPath, content, { encoding: "utf-8", mode: 0o600 }),
withFileOperationRetry(() =>
fs.writeFile(tempPath, content, { encoding: "utf-8", mode: 0o600 }),
),
statTemp: (tempPath: string) => fs.stat(tempPath),
renameTempToPath: async (tempPath: string) => {
let lastError: NodeJS.ErrnoException | null = null;
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -1875,8 +1880,11 @@ async function saveAccountsUnlocked(storage: AccountStorageV3): Promise<void> {
}
},
cleanupTemp: async (tempPath: string) => {
// The temp file holds the full account store (refresh tokens, 0o600).
// Retry cleanup so a transient lock can't strand a secret-bearing *.tmp
// next to the destination; swallow a persistent failure (best effort).
try {
await fs.unlink(tempPath);
await withFileOperationRetry(() => fs.unlink(tempPath));
} catch {
// Ignore cleanup failure.
}
Expand Down
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