Skip to content
Prev Previous commit
Next Next commit
Create windows_expand_cabinet_file_extraction.yml
  • Loading branch information
MHaggis committed Sep 19, 2025
commit 10f15a508b54b1f01b516eb291cf5720128651e3
85 changes: 85 additions & 0 deletions detections/endpoint/windows_expand_cabinet_file_extraction.yml
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
name: Windows Expand Cabinet File Extraction
id: 4e3e3b8c-6d3a-4b47-9f5a-9e3e0a0a6f2f
version: 1
date: '2025-09-18'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: |
Detects usage of expand.exe to extract Microsoft Cabinet (CAB) archives, with
emphasis on extractions into `C:\\ProgramData` or similar staging locations. In
recent APT37 activity, a CAB payload (e.g., wonder.cab) was expanded into
ProgramData prior to persistence and execution. This behavior is a strong signal
for ingress tool transfer and staging of payloads.
data_source:
- Sysmon EventID 1
- Windows Event Log Security 4688
- CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search: |
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
where Processes.process_name="expand.exe"
(Processes.process="* -F:* *" OR Processes.process="* /F:* *")
(Processes.process="*.cab*" OR Processes.process="*\\ProgramData\\*")
by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_path Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.process_path Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_expand_cabinet_file_extraction_filter`
how_to_implement: |
This analytic relies on process creation telemetry mapped to the Endpoint.Processes
datamodel (e.g., Sysmon EID 1 or EDR). Ensure full command-line logging is enabled
to capture expand.exe arguments, including `/F:*` or `-F:*` and destination paths.
known_false_positives: |
Legitimate software deployment or administrators may use expand.exe for local
file extraction. Filter by approved deployment tools, signed parent processes,
and sanctioned paths.
references:
- https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/apt37-targets-windows-rust-backdoor-and-python-loader
drilldown_searches:
- name: View the detection results for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
search: '%original_detection_search% | search user = "$user$" dest = "$dest$"'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
- name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
search: |
| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$","$dest$") starthoursago=168
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name"
values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories"
values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics"
by normalized_risk_object
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
rba:
message: expand.exe extracted cabinet contents on $dest$ executed by $user$.
risk_objects:
- field: dest
type: system
score: 30
- field: user
type: system
score: 30
threat_objects:
- field: process_name
type: process_name
tags:
analytic_story:
- APT37 Rustonotto and FadeStealer
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
- T1105
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1140/atomic_red_team/expand_windows-sysmon.log
source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog