Add timeout to requests calls

[pixee-latio]

Many developers will be surprised to learn that requests library calls do not include timeouts by default. This means that an attempted request could hang indefinitely if no connection is established or if no data is received from the server.

The requests documentation suggests that most calls should explicitly include a timeout parameter. This codemod adds a default timeout value in order to set an upper bound on connection times and ensure that requests connect or fail in a timely manner. This value also ensures the connection will timeout if the server does not respond with data within a reasonable amount of time.

While timeout values will be application dependent, we believe that this codemod adds a reasonable default that serves as an appropriate ceiling for most situations.

Our changes look like the following:

 import requests
 
- requests.get("http://example.com")
+ requests.get("http://example.com", timeout=60)

More reading

• https://docs.python-requests.org/en/master/user/quickstart/#timeouts

I have additional improvements ready for this repo! If you want to see them, leave the comment:

@pixeebot next

... and I will open a new PR right away!

🧚🤖 Powered by Pixeebot

Feedback | Community | Docs | Codemod ID: pixee:python/add-requests-timeouts

[dryrunsecurity]

DryRun Security Summary

The code changes involve security improvements in an application and LLM testing, but also include a concerning ransomware implementation that could potentially harm victims by encrypting their files.

Expand for full summary

Summary:

The provided code changes cover a variety of scenarios, including security improvements, the use of large language models (LLMs), and a concerning ransomware implementation.

The changes to the insecure-app/app.py file demonstrate a positive security improvement by adding a timeout to the requests.get() call, which helps mitigate potential Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerabilities. However, the application still has several other security vulnerabilities that need to be addressed.

The changes to the llm-testing/llm-testing.py file show the implementation of security measures when working with LLMs, such as input and output scanning, which is a good security practice. However, the hardcoded Hugging Face API token is a potential security risk that should be addressed.

The changes to the insecure-app/ransomware.py file are the most concerning, as they implement a ransomware attack that encrypts the victim's files and maintains control over the decryption process. This type of malware can have severe consequences for victims and should be prevented from being deployed and executed.

Files Changed:

1. insecure-app/app.py: The changes add a timeout parameter to the requests.get() call, which helps mitigate potential SSRF vulnerabilities. However, the application still has several other security vulnerabilities that need to be addressed.

2. llm-testing/llm-testing.py: The changes add a timeout parameter to the requests.post() call and implement input and output scanning using the llm_guard library, which is a positive security improvement. However, the hardcoded Hugging Face API token is a potential security risk that should be addressed.

3. insecure-app/ransomware.py: The changes increase the timeout for the IP request and implement a ransomware attack that encrypts the victim's files and maintains control over the decryption process. This type of malware can have severe consequences for victims and should be prevented from being deployed and executed.

Code Analysis

We ran 9 analyzers against 3 files and 0 analyzers had findings. 9 analyzers had no findings.

View PR in the DryRun Dashboard.

[jit-ci]

❌ Jit has detected 2 important findings in this PR that you should review.
The findings are detailed below as separate comments.
It’s highly recommended that you fix these security issues before merge.

[jit-ci]

Security control: Static Code Analysis Python Semgrep

Server-Side Request Forgery (Ssrf) Risk With User Data In Requests In Django

Data from request object is passed to a new server-side request. This could lead to a server-side request forgery (SSRF). To mitigate, ensure that schemes and hosts are validated against an allowlist, do not forward the response to the user, and ensure proper authentication and transport-layer security in the proxied request. See https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Server_Side_Request_Forgery to learn more about SSRF vulnerabilities.

Severity: HIGH

Learn more about this issue

---

Fix suggestion:

This fix suggestion was generated by Jit. Please note that the suggestion might not always fit every use case. It is highly recommended that you check and review it before merging.

Suggestion guidelines

This remediation will modify the vulnerable request call in your code to validate the target URL before making a request. This helps prevent server-side request forgery (SSRF) attacks by ensuring that only allowed URLs are used.

Suggested change

	response = requests.get(url, timeout=60)
	response = requests.get(url, timeout=60get.lower() in ['get', 'post'] and ensure_allowed_url()

---

Jit Bot commands and options (e.g., ignore issue)

You can trigger Jit actions by commenting on this PR review:

• #jit_ignore_fp Ignore and mark this specific single instance of finding as “False Positive”
• #jit_ignore_accept Ignore and mark this specific single instance of finding as “Accept Risk”
• #jit_ignore_type_in_file Ignore any finding of type "Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) risk with user data in requests in Django" in insecure-app/app.py; future occurrences will also be ignored.
• #jit_undo_ignore Undo ignore command

[jit-ci]

Security control: Static Code Analysis Python Semgrep

Potential Ssrf With Request Data In Server-Side Requests

Data from request object is passed to a new server-side request. This could lead to a server-side request forgery (SSRF). To mitigate, ensure that schemes and hosts are validated against an allowlist, do not forward the response to the user, and ensure proper authentication and transport-layer security in the proxied request.

Severity: HIGH

Learn more about this issue

---

Jit Bot commands and options (e.g., ignore issue)

You can trigger Jit actions by commenting on this PR review:

• #jit_ignore_fp Ignore and mark this specific single instance of finding as “False Positive”
• #jit_ignore_accept Ignore and mark this specific single instance of finding as “Accept Risk”
• #jit_ignore_type_in_file Ignore any finding of type "Potential SSRF with request data in server-side requests" in insecure-app/app.py; future occurrences will also be ignored.
• #jit_undo_ignore Undo ignore command

[pixee-latio]

I'm confident in this change, but I'm not a maintainer of this project. Do you see any reason not to merge it?

If this change was not helpful, or you have suggestions for improvements, please let me know!

[pixee-latio]

Just a friendly ping to remind you about this change. If there are concerns about it, we'd love to hear about them!

[pixee-latio]

This change may not be a priority right now, so I'll close it. If there was something I could have done better, please let me know!

You can also customize me to make sure I'm working with you in the way you want.