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34df1fd
feat(node): add per-IP write-surface rate brake and apply to write_ro…
beardthelion Jul 13, 2026
74e05be
feat(node): extend the per-IP write brake to the remaining write sinks
beardthelion Jul 13, 2026
6fded6e
test(node): adversarial TrustedProxy verification through the write b…
beardthelion Jul 13, 2026
e6324d2
feat(node): purge-spam admin subcommand for the empty-burst cleanup
beardthelion Jul 13, 2026
285d7c7
fix(review): make purge-spam empty-check reject git-discovery reads
beardthelion Jul 13, 2026
090019d
fix(review): normalization-consistent purge, brake helper, CLI + cove…
beardthelion Jul 13, 2026
dfd4f6c
test(review): close the reasoned-not-run gaps by execution
beardthelion Jul 13, 2026
0135419
fix(node): reject path-traversal repo names in purge-spam before remo…
beardthelion Jul 15, 2026
a0fcbb0
fix(node): delete child rows transactionally in delete_repo_by_id
beardthelion Jul 15, 2026
fde9cfe
fix(node): reap write_rate_limiter in the periodic cleanup loop
beardthelion Jul 15, 2026
15522d5
fix(node): hold the per-repo advisory lock across purge recheck+delete
beardthelion Jul 15, 2026
1fcca0d
fix(node): count purge-spam disk-removal failures separately from del…
beardthelion Jul 15, 2026
d9eebd2
fix(node): warn on unparseable rate-limit env vars instead of silentl…
beardthelion Jul 15, 2026
6325402
docs(node): document GITLAWB_IPFS_API/TIGRIS_BUCKET/METRICS_ADDR/SHUT…
beardthelion Jul 15, 2026
bfbe502
test(node): exercise the dry-run guard with a real on-disk candidate …
beardthelion Jul 15, 2026
cdb102e
style(node): cargo fmt for the #196 fix set
beardthelion Jul 15, 2026
4df79f2
fix(node): pin the writer's advisory-lock connection in RepoWriteGuard
beardthelion Jul 15, 2026
68c1f5c
refactor(node): introduce ObjectStore trait seam over TigrisClient
beardthelion Jul 15, 2026
3c1ceb8
fix(node): make purge-spam Tigris-authoritative and archive-deleting
beardthelion Jul 15, 2026
cf669bb
fix(review): don't hold/leak the pool connection in acquire_write
beardthelion Jul 15, 2026
dde5ea9
fix(node): make advisory-lock guards drop-safe and reorder acquire_write
beardthelion Jul 16, 2026
b94d440
fix(node): complete a fully-received push after client disconnect
beardthelion Jul 16, 2026
e4c4161
fix(node): serialize archive uploads under the per-repo advisory lock
beardthelion Jul 16, 2026
6ba698c
fix(node): let purge-spam reach repos that exist only as archives
beardthelion Jul 16, 2026
9f7757c
refactor(node): dedup limiter setup + write-brake test driver; fix .e…
beardthelion Jul 16, 2026
2a78524
docs(node): drop the .env.example shutdown-grace entry #196 added (#196)
beardthelion Jul 19, 2026
c4b337b
fix(node): give advisory-lock guards a dedicated pool and bound the r…
beardthelion Jul 19, 2026
4934646
fix(node): advertise a window-derived Retry-After on rate-limit 429s …
beardthelion Jul 19, 2026
0c279c9
fix(node): skip slug-scoped purge cascade when a mirror row shares th…
beardthelion Jul 19, 2026
86a8228
fix(node): fail closed classifying the purge target directory (#196)
beardthelion Jul 20, 2026
bf2a54e
fix(node): run the push completion tail in the disconnect-surviving t…
beardthelion Jul 20, 2026
c24b541
fix(node): tombstone bounties when their repo is purged (#196)
beardthelion Jul 20, 2026
3baa9ed
fix(node): serialize create_repo against the purge advisory lock (#196)
beardthelion Jul 20, 2026
9916bca
test(node): prove purge deletes at MAX_CONNECTIONS=1 with the split p…
beardthelion Jul 20, 2026
8f3d643
fix(node): fail the push when the durable upload times out, don't 200…
beardthelion Jul 20, 2026
d1e596e
fix(node): tombstone bounties under both owner forms on purge (#196)
beardthelion Jul 20, 2026
ce5dcc3
fix(node): fail closed on a symlink at the purge target (#196)
beardthelion Jul 20, 2026
7dc7be2
fix(node): retry-after on the push-advert 429, and create_repo locks …
beardthelion Jul 20, 2026
d2ba14e
fix(node): correct the create-pool and bounty-tombstone remediations …
beardthelion Jul 20, 2026
5a46ef6
fix(node): close the durable-upload data-loss class on every write pa…
beardthelion Jul 20, 2026
2fa9fa3
chore: merge main (iCaptcha PoW + gl retry tests) into feat/write-sin…
beardthelion Jul 21, 2026
16517f8
refactor(node): route the per-DID 429 through the shared too_many_req…
beardthelion Jul 21, 2026
ba572b3
fix(node): init's background upload waits out the creator's advisory …
beardthelion Jul 21, 2026
859240b
fix(node): roll back the local issue ref before unlock when the durab…
beardthelion Jul 21, 2026
c07435d
fix(node): fork publishes only after a durable upload, serialized on …
beardthelion Jul 21, 2026
2ad1c79
fix(node): read-path downloads publish under the purge lock, without …
beardthelion Jul 21, 2026
b2ca5a7
fix(node): bound every under-lock object-store call and dedup the upl…
beardthelion Jul 21, 2026
fa4322c
fix(node): harden the read-path download against cancellation, stale …
beardthelion Jul 21, 2026
c3d6e73
fix(node): keep the fork's unbounded work out of the target-lock span…
beardthelion Jul 21, 2026
03ef9b5
refactor(node): move read-path download coordination into a repo_stor…
beardthelion Jul 21, 2026
4408d27
fix(node): bound acquire_write's download and free the download-map e…
beardthelion Jul 21, 2026
a12f21a
fix(node): roll back the fork mirror and archive on late clone/insert…
beardthelion Jul 21, 2026
556aa31
fix(node): serialize repo purge cascade with mirror ingest via adviso…
beardthelion Jul 22, 2026
1d8c281
fix(node): roll back local ref on failed durable upload (close/merge/…
beardthelion Jul 22, 2026
1d0d3d2
fix(node): tie cancelled cold-download cleanup to blocking extraction
beardthelion Jul 22, 2026
03cd81e
chore(node): fmt + clippy cleanup for the #196 fixes
beardthelion Jul 22, 2026
9152178
fix(node): never let a failed ref snapshot become a delete-all rollba…
beardthelion Jul 22, 2026
296704f
fix(node): slug-lock every peer-ingest writer and drive the real inge…
beardthelion Jul 22, 2026
1e79ae5
fix(node): own cold-download cleanup in a spawned task so handler can…
beardthelion Jul 22, 2026
ce25bba
refactor(node): delegate issue ref helpers to the store ref primitives
beardthelion Jul 22, 2026
4329b2a
Merge origin/main into feat/write-sink-brake-coverage (reintegrate cu…
beardthelion Jul 22, 2026
d755180
fix(node): slug-lock arweave anchor writes; fail closed when the pre-…
beardthelion Jul 22, 2026
e6f4b2f
fix(node): close review residuals: coalesce cold downloads to one in-…
beardthelion Jul 22, 2026
1459cf2
Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into feat/write-sink-brake…
beardthelion Nov 11, 2026
da876e8
fix(node): re-apply create/fork purge serialization and restore brake…
beardthelion Nov 11, 2026
edfa6bb
fix(node): close review gaps in purge, locks, and fork cleanup
beardthelion Nov 11, 2026
96ed2b2
fix(node): subscriptions-only ws schema and unsettled-work purge guard
beardthelion Nov 11, 2026
082a37f
Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into feat/write-sink-brake…
beardthelion Nov 11, 2026
e9e86a1
fix(node): wire close_issue rollback, close purge symlink gap, correc…
beardthelion Nov 11, 2026
1187dca
fix(node): close purge/upload lifecycle gaps from review
beardthelion Nov 11, 2026
261f7ab
fix(node): merge rollback, honest create rollback, purge row recheck
beardthelion Nov 12, 2026
662b9a3
fix(node): probe purge slug liveness, gate issue write brake behind t…
beardthelion Nov 12, 2026
43d4f59
fix(node): close-issue rollback uses resolved ref, drop router brake …
beardthelion Nov 12, 2026
4b483a3
fix(node): close_issue spends neither bucket when either cap refuses,…
beardthelion Nov 12, 2026
11cadb9
fix(node): refund the write slot when the close cap refuses, send Ret…
beardthelion Nov 12, 2026
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fix(node): reject path-traversal repo names in purge-spam before remo…
…ve_dir_all

A peer-mirror row skips API name validation, so a burst-owned repo can carry
a '../' name; repo_disk_path joined it verbatim and the emptiness marker check
passed on the traversed target, so purge-spam selected and remove_dir_all'd a
repo OUTSIDE repos_dir. Validate the name via repo_store::validate_repo_name at
selection (fail closed -> non-candidate) and assert canonical containment inside
repos_dir immediately before the destructive remove. Adversarial RED->GREEN: a
victim bare repo reachable via '../../victim' is deleted before, survives after;
symlink-escape covered by path_within.
  • Loading branch information
beardthelion committed Jul 15, 2026
commit 01354199d0c86905cd5cffa4ab4b3b3ec8ccff03
100 changes: 98 additions & 2 deletions crates/gitlawb-node/src/admin.rs
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -124,6 +124,16 @@ fn on_disk_ref_count(repos_dir: &Path, repo: &RepoRecord) -> usize {
/// Core of [`on_disk_ref_count`], keyed on owner+name so the execute path can
/// re-verify emptiness right before deleting (using only a [`Candidate`]).
fn ref_count_on_disk(repos_dir: &Path, owner_did: &str, name: &str) -> usize {
// Fail closed on an unsafe repo name BEFORE building any on-disk path. A
// peer-mirror row (which skips API name validation) can carry a `../` name;
// `repo_disk_path` would join it verbatim and resolve OUTSIDE `repos_dir`,
// pointing this "empty" check — and later the delete — at an unrelated repo.
// Reject it here so such a row is never a candidate (treated non-empty).
if let Err(e) = crate::git::repo_store::validate_repo_name(name) {
warn!(name = %name, err = %e,
"purge-spam: unsafe repo name — treating as non-empty (skipped)");
return 1;
}
let path = store::repo_disk_path(repos_dir, owner_did, name);
if !path.join("HEAD").is_file() || !path.join("objects").is_dir() {
// Not a bare git repo at the exact expected path. Do NOT trust a ref
Expand All @@ -144,6 +154,17 @@ fn ref_count_on_disk(repos_dir: &Path, owner_did: &str, name: &str) -> usize {
}
}

/// Whether `path` resolves canonically inside `root`. Both are canonicalized so
/// symlinks and `..` segments are fully resolved before the containment test; a
/// path that does not exist (or a root that cannot be canonicalized) fails closed
/// to `false`. Used as the last gate before a destructive `remove_dir_all`.
fn path_within(path: &Path, root: &Path) -> bool {
match (std::fs::canonicalize(path), std::fs::canonicalize(root)) {
(Ok(p), Ok(r)) => p.starts_with(&r),
_ => false,
}
}

/// Split selected candidates into (delete, skip) by a fresh emptiness re-check,
/// so a repo that gained a ref between selection and deletion (a TOCTOU push)
/// is never deleted. Pure over the `recheck` closure so the skip branch is
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -239,9 +260,16 @@ pub async fn run_purge_spam(db: &Db, repos_dir: &Path, execute: bool) -> Result<
Ok(n) => {
deleted += n;
// Remove the now-orphaned on-disk bare repo (empty, so cheap) so
// the DB row and disk stay consistent.
// the DB row and disk stay consistent. Belt-and-suspenders: assert
// the resolved path is canonically INSIDE repos_dir before any
// remove_dir_all, so a symlinked slug dir or any residual traversal
// can never delete outside the repo root (the name is already
// validated at selection; this guards the destructive op itself).
let path = store::repo_disk_path(&repos_dir, &c.owner_did, &c.name);
if let Err(e) = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&path) {
if !path_within(&path, &repos_dir) {
warn!(repo = %c.id, path = %path.display(),
"purge-spam: on-disk path escapes repos_dir — refusing to remove");
} else if let Err(e) = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&path) {
Comment thread
beardthelion marked this conversation as resolved.
Resolved
warn!(repo = %c.id, path = %path.display(), err = %e,
"purge-spam: deleted DB row but could not remove on-disk repo dir");
}
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -564,6 +592,47 @@ mod db_tests {
assert!(!path.exists(), "on-disk bare repo dir must be removed too");
}

// U1 (M3): a burst-owned row whose NAME traverses out of repos_dir must never
// cause a delete OUTSIDE repos_dir. Adversarial must-not: a real empty bare repo
// planted as a "victim" beside repos_dir is reachable from repos_dir/<slug>/ via
// a `../../victim` name; because the traversed path IS a real bare repo, the
// marker check passes and the candidate is selected — then remove_dir_all would
// delete the victim. The name validator must reject it so the victim survives.
#[sqlx::test]
async fn traversal_name_cannot_delete_a_repo_outside_repos_dir(pool: PgPool) {
let db = db(pool).await;
let root = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();
let repos_dir = root.path().join("repos");
std::fs::create_dir_all(&repos_dir).unwrap();

// The burst DID's own slug dir must exist for the OS to resolve the `..`
// segments (a burst that owns any normal repo already has this dir).
let slug = SPAM_BURST_TARGET_DID.replace([':', '/'], "_");
std::fs::create_dir_all(repos_dir.join(&slug)).unwrap();

// Victim: a real empty bare repo OUTSIDE repos_dir (sibling under root).
let victim = root.path().join("victim.git");
store::init_bare(&victim).unwrap();
assert!(victim.join("HEAD").is_file(), "victim precondition");

// Sanity: the evil name resolves from repos_dir/<slug>/ onto the victim.
let evil = rec("evil", SPAM_BURST_TARGET_DID, "../../victim");
let traversed = store::repo_disk_path(&repos_dir, &evil.owner_did, &evil.name);
assert_eq!(
std::fs::canonicalize(&traversed).unwrap(),
std::fs::canonicalize(&victim).unwrap(),
"test setup: the evil name must resolve onto the victim"
);

db.create_repo(&evil).await.unwrap();
run_purge_spam(&db, &repos_dir, true).await.unwrap();

assert!(
victim.join("HEAD").is_file(),
"a repo OUTSIDE repos_dir must never be deleted via a traversal name"
);
}

// The DB query normalizes did:key form (OWNER_KEY_CASE_SQL), so a burst repo
// stored in SHORT (bare) form is still found when querying by the full-form
// target DID — the SQL side of the normalization fix.
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -648,6 +717,33 @@ mod db_tests {
assert_eq!(on_disk_ref_count(tmp.path(), &repo), 0);
}

/// The belt-and-suspenders containment gate (`path_within`) must reject a path
/// that resolves outside repos_dir even when the *name* itself is innocuous —
/// e.g. the owner slug dir is a symlink pointing elsewhere. Layer 1 (name
/// validation) can't see this; only the canonical-containment check catches it.
#[test]
fn path_within_rejects_symlink_escape() {
let root = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();
let repos_dir = root.path().join("repos");
std::fs::create_dir_all(&repos_dir).unwrap();

// A real dir outside repos_dir, and a symlink INTO repos_dir that targets it.
let outside = root.path().join("outside.git");
std::fs::create_dir_all(&outside).unwrap();
let link = repos_dir.join("evil.git");
std::os::unix::fs::symlink(&outside, &link).unwrap();

// The name is innocuous, but the path resolves outside repos_dir.
assert!(
!path_within(&link, &repos_dir),
"a symlink escaping repos_dir must fail the containment gate"
);
// A genuine path inside repos_dir passes.
let inside = repos_dir.join("real.git");
std::fs::create_dir_all(&inside).unwrap();
assert!(path_within(&inside, &repos_dir), "an in-root path must pass");
}

/// The exclusion gate and the target scope must never overlap: if the burst
/// target were ever set to an excluded DID, the gate would fail to protect it.
#[test]
Expand Down
2 changes: 1 addition & 1 deletion crates/gitlawb-node/src/git/repo_store.rs
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -324,7 +324,7 @@ fn validate_owner_did(owner_did: &str) -> Result<()> {
Ok(())
}

fn validate_repo_name(repo_name: &str) -> Result<()> {
pub(crate) fn validate_repo_name(repo_name: &str) -> Result<()> {
if repo_name.is_empty() {
anyhow::bail!("repo_name is empty");
}
Expand Down